Subconscious Percepts as “Unmonitored” Percepts: An Empirical Study

Abstract

In exp1ainingunattended or "subconscious" perception, Dixonian theory supposes that unattended percepts are unconscious. Alternatively, the theory of cognitivestate monitoring supposes that one's unattended percepts are conscious sensations, which are accompanied by no selfconsciousness that one is perceiving, rather than imaging, them. Consistent with the latter theoretical supposition, the results of the current experiment show that previously unattended stimuli are memorially indistinguishable both from previously attended stimuli and from previously imaged stimuli.The present article examines the nature of 'subconscious' perception, particularly unattended vision. In the introductory paragraphs, two theoretical approaches to 'subconscious' perception are considered. Dixon's theory assumes that both attended and unattended stimuli are unconsciously perceived, but that only attended stimuli are subsequently represented as conscious sensations [1,2]. In contrast, Kunzendorf's theory assumes that both attended and unattended stimuli are consciously represented as sensations, but that only attended stimuli are accompanied by the self-awareness that one is perceiving them [3]. An experiment supporting this second theory is described, following the introduction of both approaches.In two recent books, Dixon theorized that all stimuli are initially perceived unconsciously-not 'subconsciously' but unconsciously [1,2]. For example, he argued that attended stimuli are perceived 'preconsciously' at first and consciously at a later stage of processing. He also argued that unattended stimuli are simply perceived unconsciously, without achieving conscious representation. 365 e 1985, Baywood Publishin& ce., Inc.

Source monitoring as an explanation for the illusion of “self as subject”.

“…Kunzendorf (1984) and Kunzendorf and Butler (1992) conducted comparative tests of Dixon's latter argument for sensationless preconscious perception and Fechner's historic argument for conscious sensation without self-conscious apperception. Kunzendorf (1984) found that subjects were memorially unable to distinguish between visual sensations previously imagined and visual sensations previously perceived in the periphery of the visual field, and concluded that the unattended sensations in the periphery were subconsciously perceived sensations-conscious sensations unaccompanied by any self-conscious apperception or any self-conscious monitoring of their perceptual (vs. imaginal) source. Kunzendorf and Butler (1992) experimentally tested Julesz's (1971) assertion that, during the "cyclopean perception" of random-dot stereograms, monocular input to the stereogram is processed nonconsciously.…”