Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm

Kawase, Yasushi; Bando, Keisuke

doi:10.1007/s00182-021-00758-0

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2022

2024

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Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…Other papers have also considered sequential versions of allocation rules, such as multiunit auctions (Ausubel, 2004(Ausubel, , 2006, stable (Bó and Hakimov, 2020;Kawase and Bando, 2019;Haeringer and Iehle, 2019) and more general allocations (Schummer and Velez, 2017). Moreover, there is a growing literature evaluating sequential mechanisms used in the field (Gong and Liang, 2016;Grenet et al, 2019;Veski et al, 2017;Dur et al, 2018).…”

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confidence: 99%

Pick-an-object Mechanisms

Bó

Hakimov

2020

SSRN Journal

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confidence: 99%

Pick-an-object Mechanisms

Bó

Hakimov

2020

SSRN Journal

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“…In the context of economics, the outcomes generated by decentralized matching markets have been studied under various conditions [30,3,4,5,26,31,15,16]. Most existing studies have analyzed when a decentralized market will yield a stable matching.…”

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confidence: 99%

Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching Games

Kawase

Yamaguchi

Yokoi

2019

ACM Trans. Econ. Comput.

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We study a decentralized matching market in which firms sequentially make offers to potential workers. For each offer, the worker can choose “accept” or “reject,” but the decision is irrevocable. The acceptance of an offer guarantees her job at the firm, but it may also eliminate chances of better offers from other firms in the future. We formulate this market as a perfect-information extensive-form game played by the workers. Each instance of this game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE), which does not necessarily lead to a stable matching and has some perplexing properties. We show a dichotomy result that characterizes the complexity of computing the SPE. The computation is tractable if each firm makes offers to at most two workers or each worker receives offers from at most two firms. In contrast, it is PSPACE-hard even if both firms and workers are related to at most three offers. We also study engineering aspects of this matching market. It is shown that, for any preference profile, we can design an offering schedule of firms so that the worker-optimal stable matching is realized in the SPE.

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Mackenzie

Zhou

2022

Journal of Economic Theory

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Subgame perfect equilibria under the deferred acceptance algorithm

Cited by 5 publications

References 34 publications

Pick-an-object Mechanisms

Pick-an-object Mechanisms

Subgame Perfect Equilibria of Sequential Matching Games

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