In this paper, I use a unique empirical setting that allows me to compare the performance of teachers hired in a discretionary process led by the teachers' union in Mexico with the performance of those hired on the basis of a screening rule (test scores on a standardized exam). My results show that the discretionary hires perform considerably worse than the rulebased hires (as measured by value added to student achievement). The evidence presented here shows the impact of personnel selection mechanisms on the quality of public service delivery.Small sections of text, that are less than two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission as long as this document is stated. Findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of its author(s), and it cannot be, in any way, attributed to CAF, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent. CAF does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and is not, in any way, responsible for any consequences resulting from its use. RULES VS. DISCRETION IN PUBLIC SERVICE: TEACHER HIRING IN MEXICO REGLAS VS DISCRECIÓN EN EL SERVICIO PÚBLICO: SELECCIÓN DE DOCENTES EN MÉXICO Estrada, R. CAF -Documento de trabajo N° 2017/11 08/2017RESUMEN En este estudio, utilizo un contexto empírico único que me permite comparar el desempeño de docentes seleccionados en un proceso discrecional liderado por el sindicato de maestros en México con el de docentes seleccionados en un concurso basado en un examen estandarizado. Mis resultados muestran que los docentes seleccionados mediante el método discrecional tienen un desempeño considerablemente menor que el de los docentes seleccionados mediante el concurso (midiendo desempeño como el valor agregado al logro académico de los estudiantes). La evidencia presentada en este estudio revela la importancia de los métodos de selección de personal para la calidad de los servicios públicos.Small sections of text, that are less than two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission as long as this document is stated. Findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed in this publication are the sole responsibility of its author(s), and it cannot be, in any way, attributed to CAF, its Executive Directors or the countries they represent. CAF does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and is not, in any way, responsible for any consequences resulting from its use.
AbstractIn this paper, I use a unique empirical setting that allows me to compare the performance of teachers hired in a discretionary process led by the teachers' union in Mexico with the performance of those hired on the basis of a screening rule (test scores on a standardized exam). My results show that the discretionary hires perform considerably worse than the rule-based hires (as measured by value added to student achievement). The evidence presented here shows the impact of personnel selection mechanisms on the quality of public service delivery. JEL: I21, J51, M51.