1994
DOI: 10.2307/2118358
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Subjective Performance Measures in Optimal Incentive Contracts

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
1
1
1
1

Citation Types

22
563
5
15

Year Published

2005
2005
2023
2023

Publication Types

Select...
9

Relationship

0
9

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 960 publications
(605 citation statements)
references
References 18 publications
22
563
5
15
Order By: Relevance
“…Entretanto, quando há o envolvimento de recompensas atreladas a medidas de desempenho, os empregados podem promover iniciativas em suas atividades que tenham como principal enfoque o aumento de suas compensações, afetando dessa forma suas decisões sobre quais devem ser as ações consideradas prioritárias (Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 1994).…”
Section: O Alinhamento Estratégico E a Atribuição De Pesos Para Indicunclassified
“…Entretanto, quando há o envolvimento de recompensas atreladas a medidas de desempenho, os empregados podem promover iniciativas em suas atividades que tenham como principal enfoque o aumento de suas compensações, afetando dessa forma suas decisões sobre quais devem ser as ações consideradas prioritárias (Baker, Gibbons & Murphy, 1994).…”
Section: O Alinhamento Estratégico E a Atribuição De Pesos Para Indicunclassified
“…As discussed in the accounting literature on performance measure selection, however, even for the evaluation of managers or professionals in organizations, a wide array of objective performance measures will usually be available, and these measures can be used in any possible combination to provide an overall indication of the evaluatee's job performance in a specific period (Gibbs et al, 2004;Larcker, 1998, 2002). Therefore, even at the managerial level, organizations' evaluation procedures can range from very subjective to very objective, where subjectivity is defined as the extent to which the person responsible for the evaluation has a direct personal influence on the rating (Baker et al, 1988(Baker et al, , 1994.…”
Section: Research Hypothesesmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The public supervisor, however, may have implicit incentives efficiently to supervise the private operator and refrain from accepting bribes; these incentives may be based on reputational (career) concerns (Gibbons and Murphy 1992;Baker et al 1994;Dewatripont et al 1999). To understand why, notice that labor contracts in the public bureaucracy are typically long-term and thus create a future wage stream for the public warden.…”
Section: Contrasting State-run and Privately Operated Services In Thementioning
confidence: 99%