This paper introduces the concept of netchain analysis. A netchain is a set of networks comprised of horizontal ties between firms within a particular industry or group, which are sequentially arranged based on vertical ties between firms in different layers. Netchain analysis interprets supply chain and network perspectives on inter-organisational collaboration with particular emphasis on the value creating and coordination mechanism sources. We posit that sources of value and coordination mechanisms correspond to particular and distinct types of interdependencies: pooled, sequential, and reciprocal. It is further argued that the recognition and accounting of these simultaneous interdependencies is crucial for a more advanced understanding of complex inter-organisational relations. The paper concludes with an analysis of a set of netchain configuration examples, including buyer-supplier relationships, information technology induced interorganization collaborations, and the introduction of the "macrohierarchy" organization structure.

We analyze the new varieties of state capitalism in the 21st century and explore their implications in terms of both strategic and governance outcomes. We begin by discussing how the current theoretical perspectives conceptualize state-owned enterprises' strategic behavior. Then we introduce a stylized distinction between four broad, new varieties of state capitalism-wholly owned state-owned enterprises, the state as a majority investor, the state as a minority investor, and the state as a strategic supporter of specific sectors-and survey each type within the different theoretical perspectives. Last, we examine firm performance for each type of state capitalism relative to private firms and contingent on country-level institutional contingencies. This article contributes to existing debates on comparative capitalisms and the current role of the state.

In many countries, firms face institutional "voids" that raise the costs of doing business and thwart entrepreneurial activity. We examine a particular mechanism that may address those voids: minority state ownership. Minority stakes are less affected by the "agency distortions" commonly found for full-fledged state ownership. Using panel data from publicly traded firms in Brazil, where the government holds minority stakes through its development bank, we find a positive effect of those stakes on firms' returns on assets and on the capital expenditures of financially constrained firms with investment opportunities. However, these positive effects are substantially reduced when minority stakes are allocated to business group affiliates and as local institutions develop. Therefore, we shed light on the firm-level implications of minority state ownership, a topic that has received scant attention in the strategy literature. Strategy scholars adopting an institutions-based view have argued that emerging economies are plagued with myriad voids in institutions that critically affect firm-level behavior and performance (e.g.

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