What Do State-Owned Development Banks Do? Evidence from BNDES, 2002–09

Lazzarini, Sérgio G.; Musacchio, Aldo; Bandeira-de-Mello, Rodrigo; Marcon, Rosilene

doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.08.016

Cited by 195 publications

(245 citation statements)

References 43 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

152

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…But even if recipients of public loans do not have their credit constraints released, and therefore do not increase their investments, they may become more leveraged and profitable by lowering the cost of capital (see Inoue, Lazzarini andMusacchio, 2013, andLazzarini et al, 2014).…”

Section: Government-sponsored Loans Investments Indebtedness and Fimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Carvalho's (2014) study, based on Brazilian regional industrylevel data, establishes that BNDES direct loans induce their borrowing firms to expand employment close to elections in regions where incumbents face competitive races. Lazzarini et al (2014) examine BNDES direct activity through loans and equity funding to assess the role of development banks using publicly traded firms' accounting data. They show that BNDES tends to fund large and profitable firms, with no effect on investment and performance of those firms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Macroeconomic and Financial Consequences of the Post-Crisis Government-Driven Credit Expansion in Brazil

Bonomo

Brito²,

Martins

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Any dispute related to the use of the works of the IDB that cannot be settled amicably shall be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the UNCITRAL rules. The use of the IDB's name for any purpose other than for attribution, and the use of IDB's logo shall be subject to a separate written license agreement between the IDB and the user and is not authorized as part of this CC-IGO license. Bank (IDB), a revised version of this work may also be reproduced in any academic journal, including those indexed by the American Economic Association's EconLit, provided that the IDB is credited and that the author(s) receive no income from the publication. Therefore, the restriction to receive income from such publication shall only extend to the publication's author(s). With regard to such restriction, in case of any inconsistency between the Creative Commons IGO 3.0 Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives license and these statements, the latter shall prevail. Terms of use: Documents inNote that link provided above includes additional terms and conditions of the license.The opinions expressed in this publication are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Inter-American Development Bank, its Board of Directors, or the countries they represent. Abstract * Government-driven credit played an important role in countervailing the private credit crunch in Brazil during the recent financial crisis. However, government credit concessions continued to expand after the economy recovered. This paper investigates some important features of this expansion using a huge repository of loan contracts between banks and firms, composing an unbalanced panel of almost 1 million firms between 2004 and 2012. The results show that larger, older and less risky firms have benefited most from the government-sponsored credit expansion. Additionally, although higher access to earmarked credit tends to lead to higher leverage, the effect on investment appears to be insignificant for publicly traded firms. Since interest rates on earmarked loans are lower than market interest rates, firms with higher access to this type of loan tend to lower the cost of debt.JEL classifications: G20, H1, L3, O16

show abstract

Section: Government-sponsored Loans Investments Indebtedness and Fimentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Macroeconomic and Financial Consequences of the Post-Crisis Government-Driven Credit Expansion in Brazil

Bonomo

Brito²,

Martins

2015

SSRN Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…State-owned firms, along with MNEs and large-scale private firms, dominated the Brazilian industrial regime in this period (Kaufman, 1990). Assessments of the development of MNEs in Brazil (Grosse, 2013;Lazzarini, Musacchio, Bandeira-de-Mello, & Marcon, 2015;Schneider, 2009;Stallings, 1990) have suggested that government-business relationships played a central role given the state's multiple roles as a competitor, supplier, and regulator (Grosse, 2013). Schneider (2009) argues that in Latin America, relationships between the state and firms were shaped by hierarchical capitalism, in which the value of market rules varied with the political preferences of those in power.…”

Section: Defining the Rules Of The Game In Emerging Economiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Economic growth rate Automotive industry's share of industrial GDP increased Government intervention (incentives, subsidy and protection) (Lazzarini et al, 2015;Schapiro, 2017) Basis of exchange between government and industry…”

Section: Economic Contextmentioning

confidence: 99%

Co-evolution of Industry Strategies and Government Policies: The Case of the Brazilian Automotive Industry

Duarte

Rodrigues

2017

BAR, Braz. Adm. Rev.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study examines the evolution of the automotive industry in Brazil and its key drivers. We argue that the rules of the game -industry policies -are an outcome of exchanges between the host government and industry. These arise from changes in economic and political environments and interdependence between industry and the country's economy. To this end, we draw upon literature on institutions and co-evolution to understand the industry footprint over a 50-year period, as well as its relationship with changes in government policies. This study generates new insights on institutional and co-evolution political perspectives by showing that the rules of the game are not only the making of the government, but are also the result of interdependencies between industry and government.

show abstract

“…A escolha dessas variáveis baseia-se no modelo elaborado por Claessens, Feijen e Laeven (2008) para verificar o efeito do financiamento eleitoral sobre o volume de crédito oferecido por bancos à pessoas jurídicas. Adicionalmente, Lazzarini et al (2015) Por fim, a variável Retorno é acrescida ao modelo em função da importância atrelada às variáveis relacionadas ao lucro da organização. As três variáveis de dívida são excluídas do modelo por apresentarem alto nível de correlação com outros regressores.…”

Section: Dados Financeirosunclassified

Investimento do governo no mercado de ações como compensação do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais

Bueno¹

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

AgradecimentosAgradeço meu orientador Sergio Naruhiko Sakurai pelo convite e oportunidade de estudar na Faculdade de Economia, Administração e Contabilidade de Ribeirão Preto. Você estava certo, realmente me surpreendi com o que encontrei. Também agradeço seu apoio e orientação no desenvolvimento deste trabalho.Agradeço os professores que se empenharam em contribuir para minha formação, mesmo quando eu mesmo teimei em fazê-lo. Agradeço aos colegas de curso, que proporcionaram momentos de muita alegria e crescimento. This study aims to contribute to the literature by investigating the incentives that pervade agents involved in electoral campaign funding. By means of empirical evidence gathered from the Brazilian electoral financing context, government investment in stocks is analyzed as a possible compensation mechanism for electoral campaign financing. The study investigates government investments in stocks comparing corporations that have supported electoral campaigns and those that have not, by applying the Differences-inDifferences method. By this method, a positive effect of electoral financing on government investment in companies stocks was identified in the 2010 electoral cycle. However, the empirical tests suggest no effect in 2002 and 2006 elections.

show abstract

What Do State-Owned Development Banks Do? Evidence from BNDES, 2002–09

Cited by 195 publications

References 43 publications

Macroeconomic and Financial Consequences of the Post-Crisis Government-Driven Credit Expansion in Brazil

Macroeconomic and Financial Consequences of the Post-Crisis Government-Driven Credit Expansion in Brazil

Co-evolution of Industry Strategies and Government Policies: The Case of the Brazilian Automotive Industry

Investimento do governo no mercado de ações como compensação do financiamento de campanhas eleitorais

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About