Subjects of ectogenesis: are ‘gestatelings’ fetuses, newborns or neither?

Abstract

Subjects of ectogenesis—human beings that are developing in artificial wombs (AWs)—share the same moral status as newborns. To demonstrate this, I defend two claims. First, subjects of partial ectogenesis—those that develop in utero for a time before being transferred to AWs—are newborns (in the full sense of the word). Second, subjects of complete ectogenesis—those who develop in AWs entirely—share the same moral status as newborns. To defend the first claim, I rely on Elizabeth Chloe Romanis’s distinctions between fetuses, newborns and subjects of ectogenesis. For Romanis, the subject of partial ectogenesis ‘is neither a fetus nor a baby’ but is, instead, a ‘new product of human reproduction’. In this essay, I begin by, expanding upon Romanis’s argument that subjects of partial ectogenesis are not fetuses while arguing that those subjects are newborns. Next, I show that the distinction that Romanis draws between subjects of partial ectogenesis and newborns needs to be revised. The former is a kind of the latter. This leads us to an argument that shows why different moral statuses cannot be justifiably assigned to subjects of partial ectogenesis and subjects of complete ectogenesis, respectively. As subjects of partial ectogenesis share the same moral status as newborns, it follows that subjects of complete ectogenesis share the same moral status as newborns as well. Iconclude by considering implications that this essay may have for the research and development of AW technology and conceptual links between a subject’s moral status and birth.

Artificial wombs, birth and ‘birth’: a response to Romanis

“…My argument, however, was that subjects of PE satisfy the conventional definition of ‘live birth’ 1. It does not matter that subjects of PE fail to satisfy some other definition(s).…”

“…She argues that ‘intuitively, the subject of CE is not born, and thus, if all subjects of the technology should be treated the same, the subject of PE is not born either’ 4. I did explicitly affirm the first two claims: subjects of CE have not been born and subjects of PE and CE should be treated equally 1. But Romanis’s conclusion is another non sequitur.…”

“…Previously, I argued that Claim (A) is true given how terms like ‘live birth’ are defined by the ‘WHO, European Union, US Law and international medical community’ 1. The WHO, for example, defines ‘live birth’ as…”

“…It does not matter that subjects of PE fail to satisfy some other definition(s). In my original essay, I noted that ‘refusing to acknowledge that subjects of partial ectogenesis have been born’ will ‘either demonstrate a misunderstanding of terms like “live birth” or would rely on a highly unconventional use of those terms’ 1. Romanis’s response fails in both ways.…”

Medical ethics and broadening the context of debate

“…The Journal of Medical Ethics has published a few papers over recent years that explore the ethical implications of ectogenesis. [1][2][3][4] It is an as yet undeveloped but theoretically possible method by which a fetus can be gestated outside of the womb, and while the prospects of 'full' ectogenesis seem some way off, there are techniques that suggest 'partial' ectogenesis could be closer. This issue's Feature Article considers two of the principal arguments that have been developed in favour of ectogenesis being permissible and available.…”