Successful visual epistemic representation

Bolinska, Agnes

doi:10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.09.005

Cited by 8 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…For instance, Mauricio Su arez ( 2004) takes scientific representation to be a form of "cognitive representation," where cognitive representations are those that can facilitate inference-making or surrogative reasoning (Swoyer, 1991) about their target systems. Others favor "epistemic representation," highlighting the knowledge-gathering role of this class of representation (Bolinska, 2013(Bolinska, , 2016Contessa, 2007;Frigg & Nguyen, 2020;Shech, 2015) or describe models as artifacts that function as epistemic tools (Knuuttila, 2005(Knuuttila, , 2011(Knuuttila, , 2017.…”

Section: Do We Need An Account Of Epistemic Expression?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Discussions of the nature of scientific representation often overlook an important distinction: between contexts in which representations serve the purpose of communicating what's already known about a target and those in which they facilitate investigation of a poorly understood target (Bolinska, 2016). But this distinction, I maintain, is significant because it highlights different functions of models and therefore different ways of thinking about what is important about them.…”

Section: Conclusion: Models As Investigative Instruments Reexaminedmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Epistemic expression in the determination of biomolecular structure

Bolinska

2023

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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Section: Do We Need An Account Of Epistemic Expression?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Conclusion: Models As Investigative Instruments Reexaminedmentioning

confidence: 99%

Epistemic expression in the determination of biomolecular structure

Bolinska

2023

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science

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“…It achieves this by simplification. It omits useless information . The intention of the map designer is to capture a limited set of aspects of reality: metro stations, metro lines, and transfer points.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is an indistinct picture “exactly what we need”? Objectivity, accuracy, and harm in imaging for cancer

Reid

2018

Evaluation Clinical Practice

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Assumptions about the epistemic ideal of objectivity, closely related to ontological assumptions about the nature of disease as pathophysiological abnormality, lead us into oversimplified ways of thinking about medical imaging. This is illustrated by current controversies in the early detection of cancer. Improvements in the technical quality of imaging failed to address the problem of overdiagnosis in breast cancer screening and exacerbate the problem in thyroid cancer diagnosis. Drawing on Douglas and on Daston and Galison, I distinguish 3 dimensions of objectivity (accuracy, reliability, and precision) and demonstrate ways they may be at odds, as illustrated in the early detection of cancer. Guidelines for evaluating the efficacy of diagnostic imaging are insufficiently sensitive to this complexity. Improving imaging quality may raise epistemic issues, place disease definitions in question, and lead to overall harm or to changes in the distribution of harms and benefits among population subgroups. With a nod to Wittgenstein, I argue that we cannot take for granted that "an indistinct picture" is not "exactly what we need."

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“…Various philosophers and scientists note the importance of features other than how a model represents a target. For some recent examples, see Jakeman et al (2006), Mäki (2009), Oberkampf and Roy (2010), Elliott and McKaughan (2014), Bolinska (2016), and Baumberger et al (2017). The current article provides a framework for thinking more broadly and systematically about this-in terms of constraints imposed by features of U, W, and B-including constraints on the representational features of models.…”

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confidence: 98%

Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View

Parker¹

2020

Philos. of Sci.

146

103

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According to an adequacy-for-purpose view, models should be assessed with respect to their adequacy or fitness for particular purposes. Such a view has been advocated by scientists and philosophers alike. Important details, however, have yet to be spelled out. This article attempts to make progress by addressing three key questions: What does it mean for a model to be adequate-for-purpose? What makes a model adequate-for-purpose? How does assessing a model's adequacy-for-purpose differ from assessing its representational accuracy? In addition, responses are given to some objections that might be raised against an adequacy-for-purpose view.

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Successful visual epistemic representation

Cited by 8 publications

References 16 publications

Epistemic expression in the determination of biomolecular structure

Epistemic expression in the determination of biomolecular structure

Is an indistinct picture “exactly what we need”? Objectivity, accuracy, and harm in imaging for cancer

Model Evaluation: An Adequacy-for-Purpose View

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