Sums and Grounding

Saenz, Noël Blas

doi:10.1080/00048402.2017.1319393

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 36 publications

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“…This principle, sometimes called '(diachronic) mereological universalism', is advocated by a number of contemporary philosophers, including Lewis (1986), Armstrong (1997), Sider (2001), andFine (1999). For criticisms of this principle, see van Inwagen (1990), Markosian (2004), Comesaña (2008), andSaenz (2018) among others. 22.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of Avicennian arguments for the existence of God

Morvarid

2022

Rel. Stud.

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In his The Salvation and The Remarks and Admonitions, Avicenna presents a well-known argument for the existence of God as a necessary being by itself. I will suggest, first of all, that the two pivotal notions employed in the argument, namely those of a necessary being by itself and a contingent being by itself, can be construed in different ways, leading to different versions of Avicenna's argument. I then turn to a specific version of the argument which seeks to show that there is at least one independently existing entity. This version constitutes the core of other versions of Avicenna's argument. Next, I shall explore how one might move from the existence of an independently existing entity to that of a necessary being by itself (variously construed). Finally, I will argue that the Avicennian argument for an independently existing entity suffers from a severe problem in that it fails to take account of the possibility of many-to-one causal relation.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Varieties of Avicennian arguments for the existence of God

Morvarid

2022

Rel. Stud.

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“…10 Cf. Saenz (2018), who argues that, if there were objects such as Theon, they would have to be grounded by the mere existence of their parts, and that in fact this is incoherent.…”

Section: The Arbitrariness Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

How to Solve the Puzzle of Dion and Theon Without Losing Your Head

Carmichael

2018

Mind

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The ancient puzzle of Dion and Theon has given rise to a surprising array of apparently implausible views. For example, in order to solve the puzzle, several philosophers have been led to deny the existence of their own feet, others have denied that objects can gain and lose parts, and large numbers of philosophers have embraced the thesis that distinct objects can occupy the same space, having all their material parts in common. In this paper, I argue for an alternative approach: I claim that human beings have ordinary parts—hands, heads, feet, and so on—but no extraordinary parts, such as ‘foot-complements’, the existence of which is essential to the puzzle. I rebut three objections to this approach: an objection that it is unacceptably metaphysically arbitrary, an objection that the view is incompatible with versions of the puzzle involving decapitation, and an objection concerning masses of matter. If we can believe that there are such things as hands and feet without involving ourselves in paradox, and without accepting large numbers of co-located material objects that share all their material parts, then that is what we should do. My view is the only known alternative which allows this.

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“…There are also principles that, though rather different from Fix, are like it in that the “innards” or “content” of the facts matter; like Fix, they are principles that are sensitive to what goes on “inside” the facts doing the explaining or being explained. See Rosen (2010, 131), Audi (2012, 108–10), Fine (2012, 75), and Saenz (2018, 103; Forthcoming, sec. 1).…”

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confidence: 99%