Supply chain models with corporate social responsibility

Wu, Ying; Hai-yan, LI; Gou, Qinglong; Gu, Jibao

doi:10.1080/00207543.2017.1346833

Cited by 57 publications

(37 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…Hsueh [8] provided a new revenue-sharing contract embedding CSR to coordinate a retailermanufacturer supply chain where the manufacturer invests in CSR. Wu et al [28] explored how an original equipment manufacturer mitigates an overseas supplier's social misconduct by setting CSR cost, and introduced a flexible quantity contract and a wholesale price incentive contract to improve supply chain performance. Ma et al [13] designed optimal contracts for a supply chain with information asymmetry where the contract manufacturer can invest in CSR to increase demand.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socially responsible supply chains with cost learning effects

2020

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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been attracting increasing attention. This paper investigates the implications of CSR upon a two-period manufacturer–retailer supply chain with cost learning effects which have been widely observed in different industries. Two scenarios are under consideration: the retailer exhibits CSR in one and the manufacturer does in the other. The analytical results demonstrate that compared with no CSR, the implementation of CSR generates higher pure profit for the entire chain. In contrast to the scenario where the manufacturer shows CSR, in the scenario where the retailer exhibits CSR, the manufacturer charges higher wholesale prices while the retailer charges lower retail prices, resulting in a higher chain-wide profit. Moreover, two-part tariff contracts are designed to coordinate the socially responsible supply chains. When coordinated, if the retailer exhibits CSR the wholesale prices are equal to the realized production cost which results from cost learning effects, while the wholesale prices are lower than the realized production cost if the manufacturer shows CSR. Interestingly, cost learning effects impair the pure profit of the coordinated supply chain when the effect of CSR is sufficiently high.

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Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Socially responsible supply chains with cost learning effects

2020

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“…A few researchers in the supply chain management area have studied CSR in theory [12,14], and most of the research in this field is focused on using empirical methods to test the impact of CSR activities on business or social performance [15][16][17][18] or building a model to coordinate the supply chain by using a contract considering CSR [19][20][21]. There are fewer studies considering the contract design in the case of asymmetric CSR cost information, and only a few scholars have studied the problem.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Theoretically, different from the existing CSR and information asymmetry related literatures that are based on the manufacturing supply chain [12], this paper first explores the provider CSR problem under information asymmetry in a service supply chain. Moreover, most of the current modeling articles on CSR are based on the perspective of supply chain coordination [21,22], and this paper deals with the integrator's contracting problem from a new perspective of screening contracts and mixed contracts. In conclusion, this paper enriches the research on CSR in the supply chain management field.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Supply Contract Design with Asymmetric Corporate Social Responsibility Cost Information in Service Supply Chain

et al. 2019

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Corporate social responsibility (CSR) has become the focus of the company’s daily operations and strategic choices. At present, the supply risk events caused by the CSR violations of service providers in the service supply chain are frequent, which highlight the importance of formulating appropriate contracts to constrain the CSR level of providers. In the context of asymmetric CSR cost information, this paper analyzes the optimal contract parameters of integrators when providing screening contracts or pooling contracts and compares their impact on profits and the CSR level. The information asymmetry belongs to classic principal-agent problem, and we will use the revelation principle to design the contracts and solve this problem. The results that different contracts have different effects on the CSR level of different types of providers. A low-cost provider’s CSR level is the highest when a screening contract is provided, while a high-cost provider’s CSR level reaches the peak under a pooling contract. If pursuing profit maximization, the integrator should choose to provide a screening contract. When the integrator needs to ensure a higher average level of social responsibility, a pooling contract should be chosen. The findings also show that service cost is an important factor affecting the CSR level of the provider, and only when the providers’ service cost is low, will providers actively fulfill their social responsibility.

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“…Secondly, this paper treats social responsibility as shared obligations among supply chain partners based on the stakeholder theory because unclear allocation is likely to lead to the "tragedy of the commons" and result in a less efficient supply chain [7]. Therefore, apart from the available literature [9][10][11][12][13][14][15][41][42][43][44]46], in this paper, different contracts are used in coordinating the supply chain, while using the Stackelberg game and the concept of super conflict equilibrium to design a novel supply chain coordination decision-making mechanism based on cost sharing of CSR to coordinate the channel and distribute the surplus profit among all channel members and obtain the optimal decisions for each member. This study not only enriches the theory of enterprise social responsibility supply chains, but also expands the application of cost-sharing mechanism in the coordination and decision-making of supply chains.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Crifo et al [45] analyzed the impact of different combinations of CSR on economic performance, and compared the results from the quality and quantity of CSR. Wu et al [46] proposed two contracts, flexible quantity discount contract and wholesale price contract, in order to encourage suppliers to invest in CSR. Their results show that these two kinds of contracts under certain conditions could significantly improve the performance of the supply chain, which provides some reference for the design of a coordination decision-making mechanism in the following research.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism with Cost Sharing of Corporate Social Responsibility

Liu

Quan

et al. 2018

Sustainability

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Abstract:The competition of modern enterprises has shifted from brand competition among enterprises of the past to that of supply chains; and considering corporate social responsibility (CSR) within supply chain management has become an inevitable requirement for improving the competitiveness of enterprises and conforms to the trend of standardization of social responsibility guidelines. This paper deals with channel coordination and decision-making in a CSR supply chain that is comprised of a dominant retailer and n homogeneous suppliers. The Stackelberg game is employed to analyze the optimal decision-making of this supply chain under either decentralized or centralized decision-making processes. After that, the thought and method of super conflict equilibrium are used to design the coordination decision-making mechanism of this supply chain based on the cost sharing of CSR to solve channel conflict and to optimize the decision. The results show that the proposed mechanism based on the cost sharing of CSR is better than those with only either the retailer or the suppliers being CSR; and it can well describe the relationship between the retailer and the suppliers, and increase the eagerness of the retailer and suppliers to carry out their CSR under various circumstances without having the profits adversely affected. As a matter of fact, this mechanism maximizes the profits of the entire supply chain system and also enhances the competitiveness of the chain.

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Supply chain models with corporate social responsibility

Cited by 57 publications

References 53 publications

Socially responsible supply chains with cost learning effects

Socially responsible supply chains with cost learning effects

Supply Contract Design with Asymmetric Corporate Social Responsibility Cost Information in Service Supply Chain

A Supply Chain Coordination Mechanism with Cost Sharing of Corporate Social Responsibility

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