Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

Gurnani, Haresh; Erkoc, Murat

doi:10.1002/nav.20277

Cited by 126 publications

(70 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…In addition, a few papers started to study manufacturer quality decisions and retailer effort decisions by considering a quality and effort-induced demand pattern in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain in which the manufacturer distributed a chosen quality product through the retailer using a simple wholesale pricing contract. See Gurnani and Erkoc (2008) and Ma et al (2013) for additional information.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative quality investment in outsourcing

Chen

Liang

Yang

2015

International Journal of Production Economics

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Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperative quality investment in outsourcing

Chen

Liang

Yang

2015

International Journal of Production Economics

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“…Gurnani et al (2007) examine how the timing of decisions such as sales effort and product quality affects the profitability of the supply chain. Gurnani and Erkoc (2008) study a decentralized distribution channel in which the demand is induced by the product quality and retailer's selling effort.…”

Section: Related To the Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Service supply chain coordination with platform effort-induced demand

et al. 2015

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In this study we investigate the effort of a service platform in cooperation with a hotel and its influence on the hotel's decision about the quantity of reserved rooms. We begin with a newsvendor hotel facing two kinds of customers: D-customers and C-customers. The D-customers order rooms from the hotel's front desk while the C-customers book rooms through a service platform, i.e., Ctrip.com. The hotel makes decisions about how many rooms to allot to Ctrip.com to achieve optimal profit. Two newsvendor settings are proposed that depict the demands of the two parties independently. We discuss a fixed payment contract and a cost sharing contract and find that the cost sharing contract achieves channel coordination and that the division of profit depends upon the hotel's payment to Ctrip.com. We then extend our study by taking into consideration the effort Ctrip.com exerts. We verify that a cost sharing contract can achieve channel coordination imperfectly if the idle cost of a vacant reserved room is shared between the hotel and Ctrip.com. Further, given that the cost of effort is shared, the channel is coordinated and a win-win is guaranteed as well if the terms of the new cost sharing contract are properly chosen.

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“…This quadratic function is established to reflect the behavior of the retailer's promotional effort and is widely used in the operations management and economics literature, such as in Gurnani and Erkoc [46], Mukhopadhyay et al [47] and Wu [48,49].…”

Section: Decentralized Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Coordinating a supply chain for deteriorating items with multi-factor-dependent demand over a finite planning horizon

Bai

et al. 2016

Applied Mathematical Modelling

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Coordinating a supply chain for deteriorating items with multi-factor-dependent demand over a finite planning horizon, Applied Mathematical Modelling (2016), Highlights• We prove the lower bound on penalty for decentralization.• We propose a revised revenue-sharing (RRS) contract to coordinate the developed system.• The RRS contract always yields a higher profit than the revenue-sharing (RS) contract.• Under these two contracts, the optimal conditions of attaining a win-win outcome are derived. AbstractThe paper considers a one-manufacturer and one-retailer supply chain for deteriorating items over a finite planning horizon. For the case with multi-factor-dependent demand, we analyze the coordination of the system within a contract mechanism. We first formulate and then compare a decentralized model and a centralized model; following this, we propose a revenue-sharing contract and a revised revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the decentralized supply chain. We illustrate the proposed models with a numerical example and sensitivity analysis of the coordination results on several key parameters. The results show that the supply chain's profit in the centralized system increases by at least 1 3 , both contracts can coordinate the system and the fraction parameter of the revenue exists when each contract is acceptable to both members of the supply chain, and the revised revenue-sharing contract always yields a higher profit than the revenue-sharing contract. Furthermore, the supply chain's profit under the revised revenue-sharing contract is shown to be equivalent to that in the centralized system.

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Supply contracts in manufacturer‐retailer interactions with manufacturer‐quality and retailer effort‐induced demand

Cited by 126 publications

References 28 publications

Cooperative quality investment in outsourcing

Cooperative quality investment in outsourcing

Service supply chain coordination with platform effort-induced demand

Coordinating a supply chain for deteriorating items with multi-factor-dependent demand over a finite planning horizon

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