Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials Throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

Bunch, K. J.; Jones, Mark; Ramuhalli, Pradeep; Benz, Jacob M.; Denlinger, Laura S.

doi:10.1080/08929882.2014.917924

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Many of these low-tech methods use a physical randomness to ensure that a broken seal cannot be faked or reproduced. For a detailed discussion see Smartt and Marleau 22 and Bunch et al 28 . In addition to the particularities of the chain of custody, the arms control treaties stipulating verified dismantlement will have to negotiate the various conditions under which a particular verification technique is applied.…”

Section: Measurements Described In the Stepsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example, for this experiment the [1,50] Finally, the chain of custody for the selection of the genuine object and its tamper-proof transportation to the dismantlement and verification facility is an important topic. Past literature has discussed various approaches for achieving this goal 6,28,29 . Exercises by the US and European national laboratories and organizations have taken place to test and characterize series of techniques necessary for this goal.…”

Section: Epithermal Neutronsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A physically cryptographic warhead verification system using neutron induced nuclear resonances

Engel

Danagoulian

2019

Nat Commun

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Arms control treaties are necessary to reduce the large stockpiles of the nuclear weapons that constitute one of the biggest dangers to the world. However, an impactful treaty hinges on effective inspection exercises to verify the participants’ compliance to the treaty terms. Such procedures would require verification of the authenticity of a warhead undergoing dismantlement. Previously proposed solutions lacked the combination of isotopic sensitivity and information security. Here we present the experimental feasibility proof of a technique that uses neutron induced nuclear resonances and is sensitive to the combination of isotopics and geometry. The information is physically encrypted to prevent the leakage of sensitive information. Our approach can significantly increase the trustworthiness of future arms control treaties while expanding their scope to include the verified dismantlement of nuclear warheads themselves.

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Section: Measurements Described In the Stepsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Epithermal Neutronsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A physically cryptographic warhead verification system using neutron induced nuclear resonances

Engel

Danagoulian

2019

Nat Commun

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“…In a warhead verification protocol, a warhead owner ('host') attempts to prove to an inspection team ('inspector') that an object submitted for inspection and subsequent dismantlement and disposition is indeed a genuine nuclear warhead. An object successfully verified may then be dismantled by the host under a secure chain of custody [5] and counted towards the host's obligations under an arms reduction treaty. At the same time, the host seeks to prevent the inspector from learning any sensitive information about the design of the warhead, whether to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons technology or disclosure of warhead architecture and vulnerabilities.…”

Section: Warhead Verificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Experimental demonstration of an isotope-sensitive warhead verification technique using nuclear resonance fluorescence

Vavrek

Henderson

2018

Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A.

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Future nuclear arms reduction efforts will require technologies to verify that warheads slated for dismantlement are authentic without revealing any sensitive weapons design information to international inspectors. Despite several decades of research, no technology has met these requirements simultaneously. Recent work by Kemp et al. [Kemp RS, Danagoulian A, Macdonald RR, Vavrek JR (2016) 113:8618-8623] has produced a novel physical cryptographic verification protocol that approaches this treaty verification problem by exploiting the isotope-specific nature of nuclear resonance fluorescence (NRF) measurements to verify the authenticity of a warhead. To protect sensitive information, the NRF signal from the warhead is convolved with that of an encryption foil that contains key warhead isotopes in amounts unknown to the inspector. The convolved spectrum from a candidate warhead is statistically compared against that from an authenticated template warhead to determine whether the candidate itself is authentic. Here we report on recent proof-of-concept warhead verification experiments conducted at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Using high-purity germanium (HPGe) detectors, we measured NRF spectra from the interrogation of proxy "genuine" and "hoax" objects by a 2.52 MeV endpoint bremsstrahlung beam. The observed differences in NRF intensities near 2.2 MeV indicate that the physical cryptographic protocol can distinguish between proxy genuine and hoax objects with high confidence in realistic measurement times.

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“…The use of Eddy current for authentication has been proposed as a unique identifier of containers [13]. This technique was further exploited to build the Trusted Radiation Identification System (TRIS) [14,15].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Barkhausen noise as an intrinsic fingerprint for ferromagnetic components

Mascareñas¹,

Lockhart²,

Lienert³

2018

Smart Mater. Struct.

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In this work, the suitability of magnetic Barkhausen noise as an intrinsic fingerprint of ferromagnetic components is determined. This technique has potential for this application because it is based inherently on the near surface microstructural features of ferromagnetic materials. All materials typically display some variation in their microstructure simply as a result of the manufacturing process (rolling, heat treating, welding, grinding), thus providing the potential that Barkhausen noise measurements between nominally similar components will be unique. In this work, we demonstrate that Barkhausen noise measurements are both repeatable in time for a single sample made from a ferromagnetic material, and unique across a number of instances of nominally similar samples. The results of this work have profound implications in a variety of applications in forensics and physical security. For example, consider the fabrication of the next generation of tamper-evident containers and devices using conventional processes for steel. In addition, since Barkhausen noise is sensitive to changes in microstructures due to grinding and welding, these measurements can be used to detect clandestine repairs and tampering. Finally, because the method inherently results in a time series measurement at each point on a sample, it is expected to have far higher dimensionality than physically similar eddy current measurement. However, the higher dimensionality of Barkhausen measurements suggest that they should be harder to counterfeit than eddy current measurements.

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Supporting Technology for Chain of Custody of Nuclear Weapons and Materials Throughout the Dismantlement and Disposition Processes

Cited by 3 publications

References 6 publications

A physically cryptographic warhead verification system using neutron induced nuclear resonances

A physically cryptographic warhead verification system using neutron induced nuclear resonances

Experimental demonstration of an isotope-sensitive warhead verification technique using nuclear resonance fluorescence

Barkhausen noise as an intrinsic fingerprint for ferromagnetic components

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