Supposition and representation in human reasoning

Handley, Simon J.; Evans, Jonathan St. B. T.

doi:10.1080/135467800750038148

Cited by 22 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…The evidence indicates that people first try the knight hypothesis, and if it satisfies, they stick with it. Similar evidence of satisficing in suppositional reasoning, on a different task, has been reported by Handley and Evans (2000).…”

Section: Hypothesis Testingsupporting

confidence: 82%

The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

Evans

2006

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

540

425

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An extensively revised heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning is presented incorporating three principles of hypothetical thinking. The theory assumes that reasoning and judgment are facilitated by the formation of epistemic mental models that are generated one at a time (singularity principle) by preconscious heuristic processes that contextualize problems in such a way as to maximize relevance to current goals (relevance principle). Analytic processes evaluate these models but tend to accept them unless there is good reason to reject them (satisficing principle). At a minimum, analytic processing of models is required so as to generate inferences or judgments relevant to the task instructions, but more active intervention may result in modification or replacement of default models generated by the heuristic system. Evidence for this theory is provided by a review of a wide range of literature on thinking and reasoning.

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Section: Hypothesis Testingsupporting

confidence: 82%

The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

Evans

2006

Psychonomic Bulletin & Review

540

425

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“…Perhaps the key to this effect lies in drawing the inference from “not (if p then q)” to “if p then not q.” On the suppositional account, this implied conditional would trigger a process of hypothetical thinking in which not-q is present in a mental simulation of p. Thus, presentation of the “p and not-q” combination matches strongly to this natural thought experiment, a mental simulation that links these two elements in a suppositional chain. The conclusion does not follow from the suppositional conditional, but it is consistent with the truth of the rule and we know that there is a tendency for people to satisfice by accepting plausible conclusions in deductive reasoning experiments (Evans, Over, & Handley, 2003; Handley & Evans, 2000). When the component propositions, p alone or not-q alone, are presented, there is no link between them that maps onto the mental simulation that the conditional triggers, consequently leading to reduced endorsement rates.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 73%

“…Thus, extracting a conclusion about a single proposition from a mental model is fundamental to the theory of conditional inference proposed by Johnson-Laird and Byrne (2002). In addition, there is experimental evidence that shows no difference in accuracy when people are asked to evaluate a categorical compared to a conjunctive conclusion for the same complex reasoning problem (Handley & Evans, 2000).…”

Section: Negated Conditionals and The Mental Model Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

The negated conditional: A litmus test for the suppositional conditional?

Handley¹,

Evans²,

Thompson³

2006

Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cogni

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Under the suppositional account of conditionals, when people think about a conditional assertion, "if p then q," they engage in a mental simulation in which they imagine p holds and evaluate the probability that q holds under this supposition. One implication of this account is that belief in a conditional equates to conditional probability [P(q/p)]. In this paper, the authors examine a further implication of this analysis with respect to the wide-scope negation of conditional assertions, "it is not the case that if p then q." Under the suppositional account, nothing categorically follows from the negation of a conditional, other than a second conditional, "if p then not-q." In contrast, according to the mental model theory, a negated conditional is consistent only with the determinate state of affairs, p and not-q. In 4 experiments, the authors compare the contrasting predictions that arise from each of these accounts. The findings are consistent with the suppositional theory but are incongruent with the mental model theory of conditionals.

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“…Findings of this kind have led to the suggestions that reasoning is by default inductive or probabilistic and that explicit deductive reasoning occurs only when people make a conscious strategic effort under instructions (Evans, 2000). There has been an emphasis on errors and illusions that may occur because of incomplete representation of possibilities in mental models (Handley & Evans, 2000; Johnson-Laird & Savary, 1999). The mental model theory has also been broadened to give accounts of probabilistic reasoning (Girotto & Gonzales, 2001; Johnson-Laird, Legrenzi, Girotto, Legrenzi, & Caverni, 1999), suggesting that deduction is better seen as a special case of the application of model-based reasoning strategies rather than as the core of intellectual activity.…”

Section: Theoretical Issues In the Study Of Deductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.

Evans

2002

Psychological Bulletin

335

223

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The study of deductive reasoning has been a major paradigm in psychology for approximately the past 40 years. Research has shown that people make many logical errors on such tasks and are strongly influenced by problem content and context. It is argued that this paradigm was developed in a context of logicist thinking that is now outmoded. Few reasoning researchers still believe that logic is an appropriate normative system for most human reasoning, let alone a model for describing the process of human reasoning, and many use the paradigm principally to study pragmatic and probabilistic processes. It is suggested that the methods used for studying reasoning be reviewed, especially the instructional context, which necessarily defines pragmatic influences as biases.

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Supposition and representation in human reasoning

Cited by 22 publications

References 24 publications

The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

The heuristic-analytic theory of reasoning: Extension and evaluation

The negated conditional: A litmus test for the suppositional conditional?

Logic and human reasoning: An assessment of the deduction paradigm.

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