Survey Article: The Coming of Age of Deliberative Democracy

Abstract

P roposed as a reformist and sometimes even as a radical political ideal, deliberative democracy begins with the critique of the standard practices of liberal democracy. Although the idea can be traced to Dewey and Arendt and then further back to Rousseau and even Aristotle, in its recent incarnation the term stems from Joseph Bessette, who explicitly coined it to oppose the elitist or`a ristocratic'' interpretation of the American Constitution. 1 These legitimate heirs to the tradition of``radical'' democracy have always tempered their vision of popular and inclusive participation with an emphasis on public discussion, reasoning and judgment. It is now also tempered by concerns for feasibility. In developments over the last decade, proponents of deliberative democracy have moved further away from participatory conceptions of citizenship and the common good and towards the very institutions they originally rejected as impossible locations for public reasoning. This new, practical emphasis on feasibility is perhaps the most striking feature of the recent boom in theories of deliberative democracy that I will survey here. Far from being merely à`r ealistic'' accommodation to existing arrangements, I show that this concern with feasibility leads to a richer normative theory and to a fuller conception of the problems and prospects for deliberation and democracy in the contemporary world.In the early formulations of the deliberative ideal in the 1980s, deliberation was always opposed to aggregation and to the strategic behavior encouraged by voting and bargaining. 2 Moreover, the superiority of deliberative democracy over competitive pluralism was established precisely by developing the distinctive rationality of``the forum'' rather than``the market.'' Rather than simple compromise or bargaining equilibrium, the goal of deliberation was consensus, the agreement of all those affected by a decision. While some worried about committing deliberative democracy to such a dichotomous characterization of democratic politics that so strongly split real and ideal conditions of legitimacy,

Do ideal ao real: as consequências das mudanças conceituais na teoria deliberativa

“…No que diz respeito ao conceito, de Habermas (1997) a Bohman (1998), passando por Dryzek (2000) e Gutmann e Thompson (2004), é possível compreender tais mudanças Do ideal ao real: as consequências das mudanças conceituais na teoria deliberativa como decorrência da necessidade de adequar o conceito "clássico" de deliberação às exigências empíricas. Daí as mudanças do discurso para o diálogo, do consenso para o acordo e deste para a demanda por justificação pública 3 .…”

“…Esse conceito é bastante contestado e hoje passa por modificações importantes (Faria, 2010) que, em parte, resultam de pesquisas empíricas (Rosenberg, 2007;Thompson, 2008;Bächtiger et al, 2009). Embora reconheçam que ela alcançou a "maturidade" (Bohman, 1998), tais pesquisas ensejam um rico debate em torno dos pressupostos "clássicos" da teoria deliberativa. Analisar parte dessas importantes mudanças analíticas, motivadas pela controvérsia entre fatos e normas (Thompson, 2008;Bächtiger et al, 2009), constitui objeto deste artigo.…”

Under the Sign of Morality. Are Moral Incentives Useful in Explaining Colective Action?

“…De hecho, en democracia, esta circunstancia es un requisito de muchos modelos de ciudadano 19 (Bohman, 1998). Sin embargo, baste un ejemplo para que quede ilustrada la diferencia a la que me refiero.…”

Sequencing Deliberative Moments

“…With the 'coming of age of deliberative democracy' (Bohman, 1998), philosophers have begun to appreciate the full force of that point, adapting their normative prescriptions accordingly. Ju¨rgen Habermas still thinks that 'justified and binding decisions about policies and laws demandy that deliberation and decision making take place face to face', but he now acknowledges that 'at the level of direct and simple interactions, not all citizens can join in the shared exercise of such a practice ' (1996, 170).…”