Symmetric and asymmetric motivations for compliance and violation: A crisp set qualitative comparative analysis ofChinese farmers

Abstract

This article applies crisp set qualitative comparative analysis (csQCA) to gain insight into the compliance motivations and behaviors of 101 Chinese farmers. It seeks to understand how eight motivations (capacity to comply, legal knowledge, deterrent effect of sanctions, cost-benefit analysis, descriptive social norms, morals, general duty to obey, and procedural justice) combine in compliant and non-compliant behavior, and whether there is only one combination of motivations or several that lead to compliance and non-compliance. It illustrates how csQCA assists in making visible and analyzing situations of interacting compliance motivations (conjunctural causality) and situations where different combinations of motivations result in similar compliance behavior (equifinality). It identifies symmetrical and non-symmetrical relationships between specific compliance motivations and compliance behaviors -indicating that motivations for non-compliance are not necessarily the opposite of those for compliance. This non-symmetry may logically be explained because deterrence plays a different role in compliance decisions than in non-compliance decisions. The article concludes by highlighting the relevance of such insights for theorizing on compliance and for law enforcement, and the limitations of the method applied. 11 64 80Asymmetric motivations for compliance H. Yan et al.

Suggested policy and legislation reforms to reduce deleterious effect of pesticides in Lebanon

“…They all need to manage this paradox of the need to use pesticides and at the same time mitigate their deleterious effects on humans and environment ( Viero et al., 2016 ). However, these countries differ relatively in the level of their people's awareness ( Sharafi et al., 2018 ), enforcement, compliance mentality ( Yan et al., 2017 ), and most importantly, their governmental resources and how much of these are invested in the management of the pesticides life cycle ( Damalas and Eleftherohorinos, 2011 ; Mengistie et al., 2015 ). It is a fact that no developing country will ever possess the resources needed to maintain comprehensive control over all the components of pesticides lifecycles.…”

It takes a village to build illegality: Minorities' noncompliance as manifestation of distrust

“…Moreover, accumulated evidence indicates that there is no one condition that explains (non)compliance, but rather multiple motivations and barriers interact to result in a (non)compliant behavior (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992; Nielsen & Parker, 2012; Weaver, 2015). To allow for a more systematic discussion of the factors that influence compliance, a few typologies have been suggested to categorize compliance motivations and barriers, such as distinguishing economic, social, and normative motivations (Winter & May, 2001, see Yan et al, 2017 for a review).…”

“…Because policy will have impact only if targets comply (Schneider & Ingram, 1990), why individuals follow or break the rules is a key question for governance (May, 2004;Tyler, 1990;Weaver, 2014Weaver, , 2015Weimer, 1993). Indeed, numerous studies that refer to citizens as policy-targets have attempted to better understand what contributes to compliance and to noncompliance, suggesting that motivations for noncompliance are not necessarily the opposite of those for compliance (Yan, van der Heijden, & Van Rooij, 2017). Moreover, accumulated evidence indicates that there is no one condition that explains (non)compliance, but rather multiple motivations and barriers interact to result in a (non)compliant behavior (Ayres & Braithwaite, 1992;Nielsen & Parker, 2012;Weaver, 2015).…”

Corrigendum

“…In Yan et al . (), the coverage of the condition ‘Procedural justice (proj)’ in Table 3 was reported incorrectly as ‘0.79’. The correct coverage is ‘0.70’.…”