1997
DOI: 10.1111/j.1430-9134.1997.00497.x
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Synergies in Wireless Telephony: Evidence from the Broadband PCS Auctions

Abstract: We examine bid data from the first two broadband PCS spectrum auctions for evidence of value synergies. First, we estimate a benchmark regression for the determinants of final auction prices.Then, we include variables reflecting the extent to which bidders ultimately won or already owned the adjacent wireless properties. Consistent with geographic synergies in an ascending-bid auction, prices were higher when the highest-losing bidder had adjacent licenses. The footprints of winning bidders suggest that they w… Show more

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Cited by 72 publications
(64 citation statements)
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“…According to the program, a farmer can bid qualified land into the program and, if the bid is accepted, contract to receive annual rental payments equal to the value of the submitted bid in exchange for removing the land from agricultural production and putting it to a conservation use. In addition to an annual per-acre rental payment, the farmer may request a one-1 Prominent examples of empirical research on auctions that involve government agencies as auctioneers such as the CRP include the series of papers examining the auctions for outer continental shelf (OCS) oil exploration tracts (e.g., Hendricks and Porter, 1988;Leland, 1978), U.S. Forest Service timber auctions (e.g., Athey and Levin, 2001;Haile, 2001), Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions (Ausubel et al, 1997), and government procurement auctions (e.g. Thiel, 1988;Levin and Smith, 1990).…”
Section: Program Description and Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…According to the program, a farmer can bid qualified land into the program and, if the bid is accepted, contract to receive annual rental payments equal to the value of the submitted bid in exchange for removing the land from agricultural production and putting it to a conservation use. In addition to an annual per-acre rental payment, the farmer may request a one-1 Prominent examples of empirical research on auctions that involve government agencies as auctioneers such as the CRP include the series of papers examining the auctions for outer continental shelf (OCS) oil exploration tracts (e.g., Hendricks and Porter, 1988;Leland, 1978), U.S. Forest Service timber auctions (e.g., Athey and Levin, 2001;Haile, 2001), Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions (Ausubel et al, 1997), and government procurement auctions (e.g. Thiel, 1988;Levin and Smith, 1990).…”
Section: Program Description and Datamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Combinatorial auctions can lead to more efficient allocations of resources than, say, English auctions, when there is complementarity and substitutability among the auctioned items. With combinatorial auctions, the winning bidder is always able to obtain all necessary resources for the completion of his task, and the auctioneer's revenue can generally increase because the expressiveness of the combinatorial auction protocol will result in a more efficient allocation of the resources (Rassenti et al 1982;Sandholm 1993;Ausubel et al 1997;Elmaghraby and Keskinocak 2003).…”
Section: Combinatorial Auction As a Resource Allocation Protocolmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In such an Combinatorial auctions have many inherent theoretical appeals. In addition, significant practical lessons concerning auction setup and effectiveness have been learned through their recent applications in areas such as selling radio spectrum rights and trading electricity power (Ausubel et al 1997;Klemperer 1999).…”
Section: Motivation and Basic Assumptionsmentioning
confidence: 99%