Synthesis of sensor deception attacks at the supervisory layer of Cyber–Physical Systems

Meira-Góes, Rômulo; Kang, Eunsuk; Kwong, Raymond H.; Lafortune, Stéphane

doi:10.1016/j.automatica.2020.109172

Cited by 109 publications

(71 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Meira-Góes et al [26] propose a novel bipartite transition structure in the framework of discrete event systems, namely, Insertion-Deletion Attack structure, and present a game-like relationship between the supervisor and the environment (the plant and the attacker) to determine if the attacker can lead the plant to a forbidden state without being detected by the supervisor.…”

Section: A Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…What we propose is a methodology for studying how the possible choices of the attacker can affect the estimate of the operator. On the contrary, previous works on cyber attacks in the DES literature, including [15], [26]- [28], consider the case of an operator/supervisor: in such a case the goal of the attacker is to beguile the supervisor so that a specification is violated, i.e., the plant reaches a forbidden state or generates a forbidden evolution.…”

Section: A Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This could happen because either the attacker can gain direct control of a sensor or it can corrupt messages between the plant and the operator assuming they are connected through a network. The particular attack model we adopt, among those that have been presented in the literature, is based on the one considered by Meira-Góes et al [26]. In particular, the attacker may insert in the word observed by the operator fake occurrences of compromised events or, on the contrary, may erase the occurrence of such events.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Joint State Estimation Under Attack of Discrete Event Systems

Zhang

Seatzu

Li³

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The problem of state estimation in the setting of partially-observed discrete event systems subject to cyber attacks is considered. An operator observes a plant through a natural projection that hides the occurrence of certain events. The objective of the operator is that of estimating the current state of the system. The observation is corrupted by an attacker which can tamper with the readings of a set of sensors thus inserting some fake events or erasing some observations. The aim of the attacker is that of altering the state estimation of the operator. An automaton, called attack structure, is defined to describe the set of all possible attacks. In more details, an unbounded attack structure is obtained by concurrent composition of two state observers, the attacker observer and the operator observer. The attack structure shows, for each possible corrupted observation, the joint state estimation, i.e., the set of states consistent with the uncorrupted observation and the set of states consistent with the corrupted observation. Such a structure can be used to establish if an attack function is harmful w.r.t. a misleading relation. Our approach is also extended to the case in which the attacker may insert at most n events between two consecutive observations.INDEX TERMS Discrete event systems, state estimation, cyber attacks.

show abstract

Section: A Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Joint State Estimation Under Attack of Discrete Event Systems

Zhang

Seatzu

Li³

et al. 2021

IEEE Access

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Of particular relevance to this paper is the work in [16], where the synthesis of stealthy sensor deception attacks assuming a fixed and known supervisor is considered; in this sense, [16] pertains to attack strategies. Herein, we consider the "dual" problem of synthesizing a supervisor that is robust against sensor deception attacks; thus, this paper is focused on defense strategies.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…II.1 corrects a mistake in the corresponding clause (1) of Def. 2 in[16], where ∅ was inadvertently used instead of {ǫ} for initializing f A (s, ǫ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Synthesis of Supervisors Robust Against Sensor Deception Attacks

Meira-Góes

Lafortune

Marchand

2021

IEEE Trans. Automat. Contr.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We consider feedback control systems where sensor readings may be compromised by a malicious attacker intending on causing damage to the system. We study this problem at the supervisory layer of the control system, using discrete event systems techniques. We assume that the attacker can edit the outputs from the sensors of the system before they reach the supervisory controller. In this context, we formulate the problem of synthesizing a supervisor that is robust against the class of edit attacks on the sensor readings and present a solution methodology for this problem. This methodology blends techniques from games on automata with imperfect information with results from supervisory control theory of partially-observed discrete event systems. Necessary and sufficient conditions are provided for the investigated problem.

show abstract

Adaptive terminal sliding mode controller design for cyber‐physical systems under external disturbance and actuator cyber‐attack

Nemati

Peimani

Mobayen

et al. 2023

Adaptive Control & Signal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article studies a novel technique of the adaptive terminal sliding mode (TSM) control for the finite time stabilization of cyber-physical systems (CPSs).By using the proposed nonlinear sliding surface, the reaching mode is eliminated and the entire system robust procedure is ameliorated. The used adaptive laws are dealt with the cyber-attacks and external disturbances which their upper bounds are not needed to be recognized, where suggested approach is more pliable in the real performance. The presented new adaptive TSM control technique guarantees the system robustness versus cyber-attacks and external disturbances. Furthermore, the proposed control method obliterated the chattering behavior utilizing the hyperbolic tangent function and the continuous adaptive parameters in the control law. Numerical simulation results indicate the proposed adaptive TSM control technique's effectiveness and success compared to the results of state feedback control, conventional sliding mode control (SMC), traditional integral-type SMC, and adaptive integral-type SMC methods.

show abstract

Synthesis of sensor deception attacks at the supervisory layer of Cyber–Physical Systems

Cited by 109 publications

References 23 publications

Joint State Estimation Under Attack of Discrete Event Systems

Joint State Estimation Under Attack of Discrete Event Systems

Synthesis of Supervisors Robust Against Sensor Deception Attacks

Adaptive terminal sliding mode controller design for cyber‐physical systems under external disturbance and actuator cyber‐attack

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About