2019
DOI: 10.1016/j.ssci.2019.08.021
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Systemic safety management in anesthesiological practices

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Cited by 15 publications
(10 citation statements)
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“…83 Considering medical staffs and equipment also as stakeholders in healthcare, Patriarca et al define the consequences of accidental events as: 1) patient is injured, 2) patient dies, 3) equipment ais damaged, and 4) staff is injured. 84 In this study, we consider adverse events mainly related to patient safety, and some negations like higher treatment cost or patient dissatisfaction, can be regarded as the lighter consequences. In a common sense, severe consequences are related to higher [41,54] Hazard in contact Discharge Toxic release Bad design of sensors Instrument aging Patient injury [5,50] Hazards in cyber Hazard in data transmission…”
Section: Causal Likelihood and Consequence Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…83 Considering medical staffs and equipment also as stakeholders in healthcare, Patriarca et al define the consequences of accidental events as: 1) patient is injured, 2) patient dies, 3) equipment ais damaged, and 4) staff is injured. 84 In this study, we consider adverse events mainly related to patient safety, and some negations like higher treatment cost or patient dissatisfaction, can be regarded as the lighter consequences. In a common sense, severe consequences are related to higher [41,54] Hazard in contact Discharge Toxic release Bad design of sensors Instrument aging Patient injury [5,50] Hazards in cyber Hazard in data transmission…”
Section: Causal Likelihood and Consequence Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The systemic approaches have previously demonstrated their usefulness in several other socio‐technical systems (e.g., evidence available from recent literature on FRAM (Patriarca et al, 2020; Salehi et al, 2021), or from several recent cases in various safety and ergonomics domains applying STAMP and its associated techniques (Li et al, 2019; Patriarca et al, 2019; Stanton et al, 2019), or EAST (Stanton et al, 2018). FRAM and STAMP are in essence qualitative safety analysis approaches, although in the case of FRAM some quantitative extensions (Patriarca et al, 2017; Patriarca, Falegnami, et al, 2018), including the application of Fuzzy Logic (Hirose & Sawaragi, 2020; Slim & Nadeau, 2020), have been described.…”
Section: About Systemic Safety Analysismentioning
confidence: 99%
“…System eoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is a system hazard analysis based on the STAMP model. It identifies hazards by analyzing unsafe behaviors in the STAMP control model [37][38][39][40]. e STPA Handbook defines the steps of STAMP and STPA as follows [41]:…”
Section: Stpamentioning
confidence: 99%