Based on a multinational dual-channel supply chain consisting of domestic manufacturers and domestic retailers, this paper constructs four models, namely, zero tariff, foreign government tariff increase, retailer strategic input, and manufacturer strategic compensation, to investigate the impact of tariffs on dual-channel pricing decisions, the effect of retailer strategic input to hedge against tariffs, and the incentive effect of manufacturer strategic compensation. The results show that tariff increases by foreign governments lead to higher product prices and lower sales volumes, resulting in welfare losses for foreign consumers. When domestic retailers make strategic inputs, the prices of products in foreign markets decrease and sales increase, which increases the profits of retailers and manufacturers and improves the welfare of foreign consumers, and the equilibrium solution of the model shows that manufacturers have an incentive to compensate retailers for their strategic inputs. When the manufacturer compensates for the strategic inputs, the profit of the retailer and the manufacturer will be improved again, and thus, the whole supply chain will achieve Pareto improvement.