Tax Compliance and Corporate Income Tax – The Case of Slovenia

Abstract

In this paper, we examine corporate income tax compliance dependence in the case of Slovenia by applying regression analysis. We have found that both penalty activities and audits are statistically significant. Moreover, in terms of the most important variables, both of the tax administration’s activities had varying effects. While penalties showed a positive impact and fell behind the macroeconomic explanatory variables, we could also observe that the effects of audit measures had a negligible influence on the dependant variable. Such a result is not in accordance with the results of other studies that investigated the influence of audits on the level of tax compliance.

E-commerce and labour tax avoidance

“…There are also empirical studies relating labour taxes with the informal or shadow economy (Dell'Anno, Gómez-Antonio, & Pardo, 2007) and the location of firm headquarters (Egger, Radulescu, & Strecker, 2013). Other studies analyse social security compliance at a firm level, the influence of penalties on compliance with SSC (Lesnik, Kracun, & Jagric, 2014) and of SSC on firm performance (S. Lee & Torm, 2017). Castel & To (2012) analyze the evasion of SSC in the informal sector in Vietnam.…”

Determinant Factors of the Tax Compliance in SMEs: Indonesia Cases

“…Lesnik, Tomaz, Kracun, Davorin, Jagric, and Timotej (2014) conducted a study in Slovenia regarding tax sanction which concluded that the tax sanction has a positive effect on the compliance. [8] Meanwhile, Engida and Baisa (2014) conducted a study in Ethiopia, concluded that the tax sanction does not significantly influence the tax compliance.…”

Tax Awareness and Compliance: An Empirical Study on Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (SMES)

“…The level of tax compliance ratio of corporate taxpayers is still below the individual taxpayers. Previous studies on factors encouraging taxpayers to be obedient examined behavior (Winarsih, 2015) and Syahputri, 2015), tax knowledge (Syahputri, 2015 andEngida andBaisa, 2014), services (Komala et al, 2014, and Suntono and Kartika, 2015), sanctions (Lesnik et al, 2014 andEngida andBaisa, 2014), trust in tax apparatus (Bornman and Stack, 2015, Hauptman et al, 2015and Sapiei et al (2014, subjective norms (Syahputri, 2015 andHauptman et al, 2015), and behavior control (Winarsih, 2015). However, the results of these studies are mixed.…”