Tax Compliance and Enforcement

Slemrod, Joel

doi:10.3386/w24799

Cited by 30 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 95 publications

(119 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Over time, more frequent and encompassing state-society interactions in heterogeneous communities enhance the state’s ability to monitor private economic activity and collect revenue. Greater reliance on state-provided public goods and services also increases incentives to invest in state capacity and pay taxes (Slemrod 1992). By contrast, the availability of community-provided public goods in homogeneous settings will lower the frequency and depth of interactions with the state, hindering the state’s ability to regulate social and economic activity and reducing tax compliance (Bodea and LeBas 2014).…”

Section: Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland

Charnysh

2019

Am Polit Sci Rev

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

How does an increase in cultural diversity affect state–society interactions? Do institutional differences between heterogeneous and homogeneous communities influence economic activity? I argue that heterogeneity not only impedes informal cooperation but also increases demand for third-party enforcement provided by the state. Over time, the greater willingness of heterogeneous communities to engage with state institutions facilitates the accumulation of state capacity and, in common-interest states, promotes private economic activity. I test this argument using original data on post-WWII population transfers in Poland. I find that homogeneous migrant communities were initially more successful in providing local public goods through informal enforcement, while heterogeneous migrant communities relied on the state for the provision of public goods. Economically similar during state socialism, heterogeneous communities collected higher tax revenues and registered higher incomes and entrepreneurship rates following the transition to the market. These findings challenge the predominant view of diversity as harmful to economic development.

show abstract

Section: Argumentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland

Charnysh

2019

Am Polit Sci Rev

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…One key explanation centers on the threat of sanction for evading taxes (see Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Slemrod, 2018). Luttmer and Singhal (2014), in their review of the state of the art, indicate that the threat of punishment appears to have a more robust effect on tax compliance in comparison with all other explanations.…”

Section: Taxation Reciprocity and The Social Contractmentioning

confidence: 99%

Opting Out of the Social Contract: Tax Morale and Evasion

Castañeda

Doyle

Schwartz

2019

Comparative Political Studies

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We examine the individual-level determinants of tax morale in low-capacity states, specifically Latin American countries, where the social contract is often perceived as fractured. We argue that individuals in such states perceive the social contract as an agreement to which they can opt in or opt out. Those who choose to opt out prefer to substitute state-provided goods for private providers, rather than pay for public goods through taxes or free ride to receive those goods. Through a list experiment conducted in Mexico City, we demonstrate that willingness to evade taxes is highest when individuals have stepped outside of the social contract. More traditional indicators of reciprocity—such as socioeconomic status and perceptions of corruption—are not significant. We bolster our experimental results with observational data from 17 Latin American cities; those with access to employer-sponsored insurance are more willing to evade tax.

show abstract

“…A variety of measures have had to be implemented in order to improve taxpayer behavior, with the goal of improving compliance with tax law and at sustaining tax revenues for public expenditure financing. Multiple mechanisms involve the compliance decision process of individuals: economic factors as well as other important aspects, such as the provision of services 5 by the tax agency and the tax culture, are not negligible in this respect (Slemrod 1991; Alm 1988; Alm, Jackson, and McKee 2009; Alm and McKee 2004).…”

Section: The Institutional Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Audit Activity on Tax Declaration

D’Agosto

Manzo

Pisani

et al. 2017

Public Finance Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This article provides an empirical contribution to deterrence analysis by evaluating the effect of tax audits on compliance taxpayer behaviors over the 2004 to 2009 period. We use two unique databases: the Tax Return Register (Anagrafe Tributaria) and Italian Revenue Agency (IRA) audits data, with a focus on self-employment and sole proprietorships. The difference-in-differences approach has been applied as estimation strategy to evaluate the effect of three IRA audit policies: on-site audit (i.e., soft audit), desk audit (i.e., deep audit), and a combination of on-site and desk audit activities. Our results show an overall positive effect of tax audits in terms of deterrence. In particular, the contemporaneous presence of soft and deep audits has the greatest effect on compliance reporting behaviors. Moreover, on-site audits show greater effects compared to desk audit activities. Reasons can be found in different purposes for which various policies are designed.

show abstract

Tax Compliance and Enforcement

Cited by 30 publications

References 95 publications

Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland

Diversity, Institutions, and Economic Outcomes: Post-WWII Displacement in Poland

Opting Out of the Social Contract: Tax Morale and Evasion

The Effect of Audit Activity on Tax Declaration

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About