Taxes and female labor supply

Kaygusuz, Remzi

doi:10.1016/j.red.2009.11.004

Cited by 52 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Cho and Rogerson (1988), Cho and Cooley (1994), Mulligan (2001) and Chang and Kim (2006), among others, are examples of the papers in this group. As Rogerson and Wallenius (2009), Kaygusuz (2010), Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (forthcoming), Sanchez-Martin and Marcos (2010) and this paper differs from the others by analyzing the role of the extensive margin for public policy.…”

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confidence: 89%

Social security and two-earner households

Kaygusuz

2015

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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In the past decades, elimination of the pay-as-you-go system in U.S. has been extensively discussed and studied. Such an elimination would also eliminate the intra-cohort redistribution done by the following policies of social security. Due to spousal and survivor's benefit provisions, the system redistributes (mostly) to single-earner married households (not necessarily progressive). Retirement benefits are a concave function of past mean earnings. Hence, the system redistributes from high earners to low earners. Finally, the existence of a cap on social security taxable earnings makes the system regressive. This is the first paper that quantifies redistributive, labor supply, and welfare implications of these policies using a general equilibrium life-cycle model. Agents start out as permanently married or single and with education levels and wage profiles, where the latter depend both on education and gender. The household is the decision maker and decides on the labor supply of its member(s) and saving. The aggregate production function has as inputs capital and labor aggregated by efficiency. Elimination of these policies results in a 6.1% increase in married female labor force participation rate. The middle-income single-earner married households experience the largest welfare losses whereas the high-income two-earner households together with high-income single households experience the largest welfare gains.JEL Classifications: E62, H31, H55, J12

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confidence: 89%

Social security and two-earner households

Kaygusuz

2015

Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control

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“…We build a static model with joint decision making within the household to determine married couples' hours worked, as in Kaygusuz (2010). A married household derives positive utility from consumption c and negative utility from hours worked h of husband ( m ) and wife ( f ).…”

Section: Model and Calibrationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Relying on a calibrated macro model similar to Kaygusuz (2010), we quantify the disincentive effects of elements of joint taxation in 17 European countries and the United States on the labor supply of married couples. Specifically, we investigate how hours of married couples would change if each country moved from the current system of taxation to a system of separate taxation.…”

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confidence: 99%

Quantifying the Disincentive Effects of Joint Taxation on Married Women's Labor Supply

Bick

Fuchs‐Schündeln

2017

American Economic Review

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We quantify the disincentive effects of elements of joint taxation in the labor income tax codes of 17 European countries and the US. We analyze the extent to which hours worked of married men and women would change if each country switched to a system of separate taxation of married couples. In this hypothetical tax reform, we keep the average tax burden of married households constant. With the exception of four countries featuring already a system of separate taxation, the model predicts that married women's hours worked increase on average by 115 hours, or 10.5 percent, through this reform.

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“…In our model, all workers are married but retirees can be single or married. Using the IRS Statistics of Income Public Use Tax File for the year 2000, Guner, Kaygusuz and Ventura (2012) estimate effective income tax functions for both married households and singles following the methodology of Kaygusuz (2010). We use their estimates (see Section 8.3.5 for more details.…”

Section: Sources Of Government Revenuementioning

confidence: 99%

Old, Sick, Alone, and Poor: A Welfare Analysis of Old-Age Social Insurance Programs

2015

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Poor heath, large acute and long-term care medical expenses and spousal death are significant drivers of impoverishment among retirees. We document these facts and build a rich overlapping generations model that reproduces them. We use the model to assess the incentive and welfare effects of U.S. Social Security and means-tested social insurance programs, such as Medicaid and food stamp programs, for the aged. We find that U.S. means-tested social insurance programs for retirees provide significant welfare benefits for all newborn. Moreover, when means-tested social insurance benefits are of the scale in the U.S., all newborn prefer that Social Security be removed. Finally, we find that the current scale of means-tested social insurance in the U.S. is about right in the following sense. If we condition on the current Social Security program, the benefits of increasing means-tested social insurance are small or negative.

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Taxes and female labor supply

Cited by 52 publications

References 26 publications

Social security and two-earner households

Social security and two-earner households

Quantifying the Disincentive Effects of Joint Taxation on Married Women's Labor Supply

Old, Sick, Alone, and Poor: A Welfare Analysis of Old-Age Social Insurance Programs

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