TCG inside?

Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza; Selhorst, Marcel; Stüble, Christian; Wachsmann, Christian; Winandy, Marcel

doi:10.1145/1179474.1179487

Cited by 49 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…Bruschi et al [7] conducted a formal study on the authorization protocol in TPM, and analyze the vulnerabilities in the protocol by model checking. [38] presented a test based method to verify the compliance between TPM and the TCG specifications. Zhang et al [47] analyzed the trusted network connect (TNC) protocols within the universally composable (UC) framework.…”

Section: Formal Verification On Trusted Computingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Recent formal studies on trusted computing mainly fall into two categories: on TCG specifications and on TCG-based secure systems. For the former (correctness study on TCG specifications), the majority of the existing formal modeling and analysis studies focus on key security mechanisms in the specifications [47,18], besides testing based analysis techniques [38,46]. Usually formal verification [47] and the universally composable (UC) framework [18] are employed to analyze the security properties.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Modeling TCG-Based Secure Systems with Colored Petri Nets

Guo

Yang

et al. 2011

Trusted Systems

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Abstract. With the rapid progresses in trusted computing related research and application, many trusted computing based security mechanisms have been proposed to defend against threats in open, dynamic and distributed environments. These mechanisms are supposed to serve as the security foundations in the underlying systems. However, the correctness of these security mechanisms still require further examination and validation. We propose a Colored Petri Nets (CPN or CP-nets) based approach to model the trusted computing based secure system. In particular, with CPN, we model process management, data protection and late launch mechanisms in the systems. Further, as case studies we use these models to investigate the memory protection mechanism in TrustVisor and remote attestation based on dynamic root of trust, respectively; and the results demonstrate that our models are indeed capable of depicting real secure system based on trusted computing. With the advantages of CPN based modeling and analysis (e.g., graphical representation, well defined semantics and a large number of formal analysis methods), our models can well serve as the foundation for formal analysis on the security properties of trusted computing enhanced systems.

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Section: Formal Verification On Trusted Computingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Modeling TCG-Based Secure Systems with Colored Petri Nets

Guo

Yang

et al. 2011

Trusted Systems

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“…RTM is responsible for taking platform integrity measurements, RTS securely stores different integrity measurements and RTR is responsible for reliably reporting values stored in the RTS. At the same time TPM supports other functions such as cryptographic key generation, data sealing and binding (Sadeghi et al, 2006). TPM contains protected storage which is accessible only within TPM and it is protected against physical attack.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A User Protection Model for the Trusted Computing Environment

Alshare¹

2014

Journal of Computer Science

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Information security presents a huge challenge for both individuals and organizations. The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) has introduced the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as a solution to end-users to ensure their privacy and confidentiality. TPM has the role of being the root of trust for systems and users by providing protected storage that is accessible only within TPM and thus, protects computers against unwanted access. TPM is designed to prevent software attacks with minimal consideration being given toward physical attacks. Therefore, TPM focus on PIN password identification to control the physical presence of a user. The PIN Password method is not the ideal user verification method. Evil Maid is one of the attacking methods where a piece of code can be loaded and hidden in the boot loader before loading TPM. The code will then collects confidential information at the next boot and store it or send it to attackers via the network. In order to solve this problem, a number of solutions have been proposed. However, most of these solutions does not provide sufficient level of protection to TPM. In this study we introduce the TPM User Authentication Model (TPM-UAM) that could assist in protecting TPM against physical attack and thus increase the security of the computer system. The proposed model has been evaluated through a focus group discussion consisting of a number of experts. The expert panel has confirmed that the proposed model is sufficient to provide expected level of protection to the TPM and to assist in preventing physical attack against TPM.

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“…The attestation of the core of the operating system, the device drives and the voting application can be cumbersome. Moreover, there are also problems concerning the maturity of the currently deployed technology [14] and concerning the revocation of cracked machines [1]. We believe that, for now, the application of trusted computing to remote voting as the only guaranty of correct application behaviour is not a valid alternative.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

CodeVoting Protection Against Automatic Vote Manipulation in an Uncontrolled Environment

Joaquim¹,

Ribeiro²

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Abstract. One of the major problems that prevent the widespread of Internet voting is the vulnerability of the voter's computer. A computer connected to the Internet is exposed to virus, worms, spyware, malware and other threats that can endanger the election's integrity. For instance, it is possible to write a virus that changes the voter's vote to one predetermined vote on election's day. It is possible to write such a virus so that the voter would not notice anything wrong with the voting application. This attack is very dangerous because it may pass undetected. To prevent such attack it is necessary to prevent automatic vote manipulation at voter's computer. Here we present CodeVoting, a technique to create a secure communication channel to a smart card that prevents vote manipulation by the voter's PC, while at the same time allows the use of any cryptographic voting protocol to protect the election's integrity at the server side of the voting application.

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TCG inside?

Cited by 49 publications

References 4 publications

Modeling TCG-Based Secure Systems with Colored Petri Nets

Modeling TCG-Based Secure Systems with Colored Petri Nets

A User Protection Model for the Trusted Computing Environment

CodeVoting Protection Against Automatic Vote Manipulation in an Uncontrolled Environment

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