2017
DOI: 10.1016/j.ifacol.2017.08.481
|View full text |Cite
|
Sign up to set email alerts
|

Team-optimal Incentive Stackelberg Strategies for Markov Jump Linear Stochastic Systems with H∞ Constraint

Help me understand this report

Search citation statements

Order By: Relevance

Paper Sections

Select...
3

Citation Types

0
3
0

Year Published

2017
2017
2020
2020

Publication Types

Select...
3
1
1

Relationship

2
3

Authors

Journals

citations
Cited by 9 publications
(3 citation statements)
references
References 13 publications
0
3
0
Order By: Relevance
“…Additionally, the finite‐horizon SOF H control problem for Markov jump systems has also been studied, and the appropriate conditions have been established in the framework of the relaxed linear matrix inequality (LMI) [14]. Although many types of incentive Stackelberg games for linear stochastic systems have been studied based on state feedback strategies [5, 6, 15, 16], very few studies have focused on SOF incentive Stackelberg strategies in dynamic games for MJLSS [4]. An incentive Stackelberg game is a game in which the leader's strategy can influence the decisions or actions of the followers such that the leader's desired solution (usually, a team‐optimal solution) can be achieved.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Additionally, the finite‐horizon SOF H control problem for Markov jump systems has also been studied, and the appropriate conditions have been established in the framework of the relaxed linear matrix inequality (LMI) [14]. Although many types of incentive Stackelberg games for linear stochastic systems have been studied based on state feedback strategies [5, 6, 15, 16], very few studies have focused on SOF incentive Stackelberg strategies in dynamic games for MJLSS [4]. An incentive Stackelberg game is a game in which the leader's strategy can influence the decisions or actions of the followers such that the leader's desired solution (usually, a team‐optimal solution) can be achieved.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…This study investigates a robust SOF incentive Stackelberg game for continuous‐time MJLSSs with multiple leaders and followers. Unlike the previous studies [5, 6, 8, 17], the SOF incentive Stackelberg strategies for such a game have been developed for the first time. Developing the SOF incentive strategies for Stackelberg games with multiple leaders and followers for continuous‐time MJLSSs is practically significant because (i) a real‐world system is usually managed by many players (or decision‐makers) in a hierarchical structure and (ii) the information structure is complex; hence, the information can only be partially accessed in most cases.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Unlike [17], where one leader and one follower are considered a stochastic system, our present paper deals with one leader and multiple non-cooperative followers. Similar to [16,17], a deterministic disturbance is considered in this paper, which is also seen in [18]. On the other hand, continuoustime stochastic systems are investigated for an infinite-horizon incentive Stackelberg game in [19], where multiple noncooperative leaders are considered.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%