Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives

Arya, Anil; Fellingham, John C.; Glover, Jonathan

doi:10.1016/s0165-4101(96)00446-6

Cited by 80 publications

(51 citation statements)

References 20 publications

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“…This provides incentives for team self-management and encourages a tit-for-tat strategy among the agents (Tirole 1988;Varian 1990;Kandal and Lazear 1992;Itoh 1993;Arya, Fellingham and Glover 1997). For example, a mutual monitoring system proposed by Arya, Fellingham and Glover (1997) provides outputbased team incentives in the odd periods, meaning that each agent's compensation is increasing in team output and that each agent prefers the other agent working to the other agent shirking. In the even periods, the system works in such a way that each agent's net profit is determined solely by the other agent's decision.…”

Section: Agency Theory On Contracting With Multiple Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Perceived Fairness and Communication on Honesty and Collusion in a Multi-Agent Setting

Zhang

2008

The Accounting Review

145

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This study examines how two factors, the agents’ perceptions regarding the fairness of the principal and inter-agent communication, affect agents’ behaviors under a peer reporting system. Analytical models show that when agents can observe each other’s actions and local signals, a peer reporting system with a verification mechanism (using one agent’s information to verify the other’s) and a reward for truthful whistleblowing can induce agents to report honestly and thereby help the principal achieve the first-best outcome. However, behavioral research suggests that the agents’ perception regarding the fairness of the principal, as well as communication among agents, may affect how honestly agents report. The results of my experiment show that, under a peer reporting system with a high reward for whistleblowing, the agents’ perception regarding the fairness of the principal positively affects the agents’ reporting honesty and negatively affects their explicit attempts at collusion. Communication between agents decreases their reporting honesty when the principal is perceived as unfair, but not when the principal is perceived as fair.

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Section: Agency Theory On Contracting With Multiple Agentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effects of Perceived Fairness and Communication on Honesty and Collusion in a Multi-Agent Setting

Zhang

2008

The Accounting Review

145

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“…Such contracts are not subject to the tacit collusion problem by virtue of providing dominant strategy incentives. Third, in repeated settings, collusion can be turned into cooperation (implicit contracting between the agents that benefits the principal) by using aggregate performance measures to motivate mutual monitoring by the agents (Arya et al, 1997a). The monograph surveys existing research on these three themes (with a fairly narrow focus on my own research) and presents a few new results.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Relational contracting and mutual monitoring among the agents create a role for joint performance evaluation, even when the joint performance measure is an aggregation of individual performances measures that could be contracted on individually (Arya et al, 1997a;Che and Yoo, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is an empirical question whether various groups of managers are best modeled using models of individual incentives (e.g., Holmstrom, 1979) or models of group incentives (e.g., Itoh, 1993;Arya et al, 1997a;Che and Yoo, 2001). In studying the impact of pay-for-performance dispersion on top executives' incentives, Bushman et al (2012) use the Arya et al (1997a) and Che and Yoo (2001) models to motivate studying the role team tenure has in mitigating poor performance.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In studying the impact of pay-for-performance dispersion on top executives' incentives, Bushman et al (2012) use the Arya et al (1997a) and Che and Yoo (2001) models to motivate studying the role team tenure has in mitigating poor performance. They speculate that the poor performance they observe is caused by individual free-riding.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Explicit and Implicit Incentives for Multiple Agents

Glover

2012

FNT in Accounting

Self Cite

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The Effect of Team Affective Tone on Team Performance: The Roles of Team Identification and Team Cooperation

Lin

Baruch

et al. 2016

Human Resource Management

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3Affective tones abound in work teams. Drawing on the affect infusion model and social 4 identity theory, this study proposes that team affective tone is related to team performance 5 indirectly through team identification and team cooperation. Data from 141 hybrid-virtual 6 teams drawn from high-tech companies in Taiwan generally supported our model. 7Specifically, positive affective tone is positively associated -while negative affective tone is 8 negatively associated -with both team identification and team cooperation, team 9 identification is positively associated with team cooperation, and team cooperation is 10 positively associated with team performance. Managerial implications and limitations are 11 discussed. 12

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Teams, repeated tasks, and implicit incentives

Cited by 80 publications

References 20 publications

The Effects of Perceived Fairness and Communication on Honesty and Collusion in a Multi-Agent Setting

The Effects of Perceived Fairness and Communication on Honesty and Collusion in a Multi-Agent Setting

Explicit and Implicit Incentives for Multiple Agents

The Effect of Team Affective Tone on Team Performance: The Roles of Team Identification and Team Cooperation

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