Temporal and Spatial Distribution of Benefits and Costs in River-Basin Schemes: A Cooperative Game Approach

Abstract

River-basin developments inevitably require participation by numerous entities (for example, riparians and external funding agencies). The division of the costs and benefits consequent to the scheme is further complicated by time schedules for implementation. In this paper the extension of cooperative game theory to temporal allocations is explored. The approach is illustrated with an example problem involving three riparians and two time periods. Propensities to disrupt are incorporated in the cooperative game in a form that permits the use of linear programming techniques. The results suggest that a considerable range of choices for decisions can be generated by systematic and random investigation near to optimal solutions.

Resolving water allocation conflicts using WEAP simulation model and non-cooperative game theory

“…From the viewpoint of AJO, the only unilateral improvement is changing the current state to u 0 1 : fA, À B, C, À Dg by not choosing strategy B. In this situation, the payoff will change to [12,2]. The state of equilibrium must be a desirable scenario after one unilateral move by both stakeholders.…”

“…A large number of studies have found the theory useful and applied it to problems of water resources allocation and management. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8] Conflicts in these studies are often handled in cooperative form and a coalition is established among the stakeholders, as investigated by Collins and Frydenlund, 9 to form strategic groups into an agent-based model through cooperative game theory approaches. Due to escalating water shortage and the growing disputes over water withdrawal, it is almost impossible to employ cooperative games to solve water allocation problems and satisfy the stakeholders, especially when the stakeholders have different interests and are not politically on a par with each other.…”

A Strategic Analysis of Urban Renewal in Taipei City Using Game Theory

“…Every player in the game has to adopt the strategy in the contract. Some research adopted a cooperative game to analyze the interactions between players when the issue involved 'positive externality' (Dufournaud and Harrington, 1990;Kucukmehmetoglu and Guldmann, 2004;Lubell et al, 2010;Tsang and Jim, 2011). The other type of game, noncooperative, emphasizes personal behavior without the restriction of any contract or agreement.…”

International Water Resources Allocation and Conflicts: The Case of the Euphrates and Tigris

“…The model is a linear program that computes equilibrium prices for both water and technology. Finally, one should mention the extensions of the traditional core constraints proposed by Dufournaud and Harrington (1990), whereby both the spatial and the temporal patterns of costs and benefits from river development are considered, and coalitions are defined across periods.…”