Temporal Perception, Magnitudes and Phenomenal Externalism

Pelczar, Michael J.

doi:10.4324/9781315269641-17

Cited by 4 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…In characterizing the distinction in this way, we have assumed that not all of the ways in which a creature might be sensitive to aspects of its environment involve that creature actually representing those aspects. That is, we are operating with a notion of representation that distinguishes representing an aspect of the world from simply being sensitive to it (see also Peacocke 2017). This has to be distinguished from a broader notion of representation such as that involved when lower-level brain mechanisms are described as operating on “representations” (e.g., one might describe the early visual system as “representing” the differences between the two retinal images, but this is clearly not part of what is visually represented in the viewer's perception).…”

Section: The Two Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition

2018

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We outline a dual systems approach to temporal cognition, which distinguishes between two cognitive systems for dealing with how things unfold over time – a temporal updating system and a temporal reasoning system – of which the former is both phylogenetically and ontogenetically more primitive than the latter, and which are at work alongside each other in adult human cognition. We describe the main features of each of the two systems, the types of behavior the more primitive temporal updating system can support, and the respects in which it is more limited than the temporal reasoning system. We then use the distinction between the two systems to interpret findings in comparative and developmental psychology, arguing that animals operate only with a temporal updating system and that children start out doing so too, before gradually becoming capable of thinking and reasoning about time. After this, we turn to adult human cognition and suggest that our account can also shed light on a specific feature of humans’ everyday thinking about time that has been the subject of debate in the philosophy of time, which consists in a tendency to think about the nature of time itself in a way that appears ultimately self-contradictory. We conclude by considering the topic of intertemporal choice, and argue that drawing the distinction between temporal updating and temporal reasoning is also useful in the context of characterizing two distinct mechanisms for delaying gratification.

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Section: The Two Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition

2018

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“…I remain neutral on exactly how to define representation. But my argument follows prominent recent discussions, such as Hoerl and McCormack (2019a) and Peacocke (2017), in assuming that temporal representation is demanding enough to contrast with mere temporal sensitivity. Such views face the challenge of articulating what does require representation.…”

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confidence: 54%

Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation

Brown

2022

Mind & Language

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Recent influential accounts of temporal representation—the use of mental representations with explicit temporal contents, such as before and after relations and durations—sharply distinguish representation from mere sensitivity. A common, important picture of inter‐temporal rationality is that it consists in maximizing total expected discounted utility across time. By analyzing reinforcement learning algorithms, this article shows that, given such notions of temporal representation and inter‐temporal rationality, it would be possible for an agent to achieve inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation. It then explores potential upshots of this result for theorizing about rationality and representation.

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“…In characterizing the distinction in this way, we have assumed that not all of the ways in which a creature might be sensitive to aspects of its environment involve that creature actually representing those aspects. That is, we are operating with a notion of representation that distinguishes representing an aspect of the world from simply being sensitive to it (see also Peacocke 2017). This has to be distinguished from a broader notion of representation such as that involved when lower-level brain mechanisms are described as operating on "representations" (e.g., one might describe the early visual system as "representing" the differences between the two retinal images, but this is clearly not part of what is visually represented in the viewer's perception).…”

Section: Temporal Reasoningmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to H&M, this system involves genuine representations of temporal magnitudes. According to Peacocke (2017), to whom H&M, too, appeal, genuine temporal representations require "representational preservation," by which he means that the creature retains a certain conception of its environment or its own states and updates it with a "past-tense label" that relates to the amount of time that has passed. Importantly, such conception "registers certain identities" between entities represented in the past and those represented later in time.…”

Section: Temporal Representation and Reasoning In Non-human Animalsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Nonhuman sequence learning findings argue against Hoerl and McCormack's two systems of temporal cognition

Corte

Wasserman

2019

Behav Brain Sci

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Hoerl & McCormack propose that animals learn sequences through an entrainment-like process, rather than tracking the temporal addresses of each event in a given sequence. However, past research suggests that animals form “temporal maps” of sequential events and also comprehend the concept of ordinal position. These findings suggest that a clarification or qualification of the authors’ hypothesis is needed.

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Temporal Perception, Magnitudes and Phenomenal Externalism

Cited by 4 publications

References 1 publication

Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition

Thinking in and about time: A dual systems perspective on temporal cognition

Inter‐temporal rationality without temporal representation

Nonhuman sequence learning findings argue against Hoerl and McCormack's two systems of temporal cognition

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