Testable restrictions of Pareto optimal public good provision

Equilibrium behavior in markets and games: testable restrictions and identification

“…Snyder (1999) derives testable restrictions of a model of efficient public good provision on aggregate-level variables and individual income. Once again restrictions exist though key individual data remain unobserved.…”

“…Otherwise, anomalies found in the predictions of the theory could be explained by changes in the fundamentals. In the cases of Brown and Matzkin (1996), Snyder (1999) or Carvajal (2003a) it is assumed that preferences do not depend on income. With the previous conditions only, no analogous independence would hold here: for different observed profiles of endowments, ω and ω , marginal distributions for U, π ω (·, S −1 + ) and π ω (·, S −1 + ), which ought to be an invariant fundamental, may differ.…”

“…, N, and N n=1 q n = q. Snyder (1999) describes the model's complete set of testable propositions on finite data in the form of a finite set of polynomial inequalities in observed and unobserved variables. Thus, the data that satisfy the restrictions form a semialgebraic set.…”

Is There a Walrasian Equilibrium in Exchange Markets with Endowment Effect

“…Building on Afriat (1967) they derive testable restrictions on the equilibrium manifold 1 introduced by Balasko (1975). Various extensions of the Brown and Matzkin framework have been developed by Kubler (2003) for expected utility, Snyder (1999) for public goods and Carvajal (2004) for random preferences [see also Carvajal, Ray andSnyder (2004), or Chiappori et al (2004)]. …”

Pareto improving taxes

“…Even when the asset market is incomplete, Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990) showed that the utility function of an individual can be identified from his demand function for commodities and assets; recently, Kübler et al (2002) extended the argument to show that every individual utility can be obtained from aggregate demand or the graph of the equilibrium correspondence as the allocation of endowments varies. For economies with a public good, Snyder (1999) obtained results concerning restrictions on the market behavior of optimizing individuals, but Carvajal (2002) showed that the results do not generalize.…”