Testing functional inequalities

In this paper, I construct a new test of conditional moment inequalities, which is based on studentized kernel estimates of moment functions with many different values of the bandwidth parameter. The test automatically adapts to the unknown smoothness of moment functions and has uniformly correct asymptotic size. The test has high power in a large class of models with conditional moment inequalities. Some existing tests have nontrivial power against n −1/2 -local alternatives in a certain class of these models whereas my method only allows for nontrivial testing against (n/ log n) −1/2 -local alternatives in this class. There exist, however, other classes of models with conditional moment inequalities where the mentioned tests have much lower power in comparison with the test developed in this paper.

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Inference in ordered response games with complete information

Aradillas-López

Rosen

2013

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractWe study econometric models of complete information games with ordered action spaces, such as the number of store fronts operated in a market by a firm, or the daily number of flights on a city-pair offered by an airline. The model generalizes single agent models such as ordered probit and logit to a simultaneous equations model of ordered response, allowing for multiple equilibria and set identification. We characterize identified sets for model parameters under mild shape restrictions on agents' payoff functions. We then propose a novel inference method for a parametric version of our model based on a test statistic that embeds conditional moment inequalities implied by equilibrium behavior. Using maximal inequalities for U-processes, we show that an asymptotically valid confidence set is attained by employing an easy to compute fixed critical value, namely the appropriate quantile of a chi-square random variable. We apply our method to study capacity decisions measured as the number of stores operated by Lowe's and Home Depot in geographic markets. We demonstrate how our confidence sets for model parameters can be used to perform inference on other quantities of economic interest, such as the probability that any given outcome is an equilibrium and the propensity with which any particular outcome is selected when it is one of multiple equilibria, and we perform a counterfactual analysis of store configurations under both collusive and monopolistic regimes.

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Testing functional inequalities

Cited by 15 publications

References 45 publications

Benefits and Challenges

Benefits and Challenges

Adaptive test of conditional moment inequalities

Inference in ordered response games with complete information

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