Testing the Club Dynamics of the BRICS: The New Development Bank from Conception to Establishment

Abstract

The article addresses the puzzle of how the BRICS members were able to overcome institutional constraints and establish the New Development Bank (NDB) in a short period after its conception. It argues that the club dynamics among the members help them circumvent internal conflicts due to the embedded mutual common interest in status attribution. The dynamics also create an informal institutional platform for them to manoeuvre through intra-BRICS competitive interests by taking a symbolic stake in the NDB's development. Club diplomacy downplays contentious issues while elevating and reinforcing issues of common interest. Such an approach is tested, however, when the focus shifts from externalized demands to collective action. Calls for reforming the global system notably through a more equitable distribution of voice and influence in the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank further consolidated the club-like culture among the BRICS members. At the same time, the push for a bold initiative of their own, such as the establishment of a development bank with the promise of massive infrastructure investment targeted at other countries in the global South, demonstrated the symbolic need to move beyond the status quo.

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