The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck

Martin, Justin W.; Cushman, Fiery

doi:10.1002/9781118661666.ch12

Cited by 38 publications

(45 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…Notably, sensitivity to accidental consequences appear to matter significantly more when people are asked how much blame or punishments should be attributed to the behavior, than when asked how wrong or permissible it was ( Cushman, 2008 ). Martin and Cushman explain this finding by arguing that punitive behaviors signal to others to adjust their actions ( Martin and Cushman, 2015 , Martin and Cushman, 2016 ). In this sense, punishment is adaptive to the extent that it improves one’s own chance of engaging in future cooperation with past wrongdoers, and thus serves as a ‘teaching signal’.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferences about moral character moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise

2017

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Inferences about moral character moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise

2017

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“…The 'did they mean to' process, on the other hand, mirrors criminal intent by operating on less physicallytangible mental state information (Cushman, 2008;Cushman, Sheketoff, Wharton, & Carey, 2013). In North American samples, judgments of wrongdoing are scaled almost exclusively by the 'did they mean to,' intent-oriented mental state reasoning process, while judgments about punish-worthiness are scaled by the degree of severity calculated by the more mind-blind 'whodunnit' process (though scope of punishment can be scaled by intent; see: Cushman, 2008;Cushman et al, 2013;Martin & Cushman, 2015). Because these processes do not perfectly overlap, mis-matches in intent and outcome (i.e.…”

Section: Permissibility and Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Because these processes do not perfectly overlap, mis-matches in intent and outcome (i.e. an accident that results in a bad outcome despite a positive or neutral intent) can receive more severe reactions than would be expected in a strictly intent-focused system (Costa, 2009;Martin & Cushman, 2015).…”

Section: Permissibility and Punishmentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Weighing outcome vs. intent across societies: How cultural models of mind shape moral reasoning

et al. 2019

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Mental state reasoning has been theorized as a core feature of how we navigate our social worlds, and as especially vital to moral reasoning. Judgments of moral wrong-doing and punish-worthiness often hinge upon evaluations of the perpetrator's mental states. In two studies, we examine how differences in cultural conceptions about how one should think about others' minds influence the relative importance of intent vs. outcome in moral judgments. We recruit participation from three societies, differing in emphasis on mental state reasoning: Indigenous iTaukei Fijians from Yasawa Island (Yasawans) who normatively avoid mental state inference in favor of focus on relationships and consequences of actions; Indo-Fijians who normatively emphasize relationships but do not avoid mental state inference; and North Americans who emphasize individual autonomy and interpreting others' behaviors as the direct result of mental states. In study 1, Yasawan participants placed more emphasis on outcome than Indo-Fijians or North Americans by judging accidents more harshly than failed attempts. Study 2 tested whether underlying differences in the salience of mental states drives study 1 effects by inducing Yasawan and North American participants to think about thoughts vs. actions before making moral judgments. When induced to think about thoughts, Yasawan participants shifted to judge failed attempts more harshly than accidents. Results suggest that culturally-transmitted concepts about how to interpret the social world shape patterns of moral judgments, possibly via mental state inference.

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“…For instance, although the behaviors of two drivers who fall asleep at the wheel while driving under the influence are judged to be equally wrong or inappropriate, the driver who runs over and kills someone is punished more severely than the driver who runs into a tree. This asymmetric reliance on outcomes for punishment judgments (vis-à-vis appropriateness) has convincingly been argued to be an upshot of the ultimate evolutionary function of punishment (Martin & Cushman, 2016), i.e., to utilize the learning capacity of social partners to modify harmful behavior, including unintentionally harmful behavior. At the mechanistic level, however, this approach is implemented via inflexible moral outrage towards the harm-doer (Martin & Cushman, 2016), possibly stemming from empathy with the victim.…”

Section: Intent-based Moral Judgments and Its Neural Basismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although there is evidence to support the claim that outcomes influence punishment judgments to a greater extent than wrongness/appropriateness judgments (Cushman, 2008;Cushman et al, 2009;Cushman et al, 2013), the exact psychological mechanism that underpins this process remains unexplored. Neurobiological models of punishment posit empathic aversion stemming from victim distress to be a source of aversive reinforcement that motivates punishment with the ultimate goal of changing the agent's behavior (Martin & Cushman, 2016;Seymour, Singer, & Dolan, 2007). Nonetheless, so far, no further distinction has been made as to precisely which component of empathy (cognitive, affective, or motivational) is involved in conveying the influence of harmful outcomes on punishment judgments.…”

Section: Cognitive Empathy and The Influence Of Moral Luck On Punishmmentioning

confidence: 99%

Elevated moral condemnation of third-party violations in multiple sclerosis patients

Patil¹,

Young²,

Sinay³

et al. 2017

Preprint

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Recent research has demonstrated impairments in social cognition associated with multiple sclerosis (MS). The present work asks whether these impairments are associated with atypical moral judgment. Specifically, we assessed whether MS patients are able to integrate information about intentions and outcomes for moral judgment (i.e., appropriateness and punishment judg- ments) in the case of third-party acts. We found a complex pattern of moral judgments in MS patients: although their moral judgments were comparable to controls’ for specific types of acts (e.g., accidental or intentional harms), they nevertheless judged behaviors to be less appropriate and endorsed more severe punishment across the board, and they were also more likely to report that others’ responses would be congruent with theirs. Further analyses suggested that elevated levels of externally oriented cognition in MS (due to co-occurring alexithymia) explain these effects. Additionally, we found that the distinction between appropriateness and punishment judgments, whereby harmful outcomes influence punishment judgments to a greater extent than appropriateness judgments, was preserved in MS despite the observed disruptions in the affective and motivational components of empathy. The current results inform the two-process model for intent-based moral judgments as well as possible strategies for improving the quality of life in MS patients.

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The Adaptive Logic of Moral Luck

Cited by 38 publications

References 47 publications

Inferences about moral character moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise

Inferences about moral character moderate the impact of consequences on blame and praise

Weighing outcome vs. intent across societies: How cultural models of mind shape moral reasoning

Elevated moral condemnation of third-party violations in multiple sclerosis patients

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