Weighing outcome vs. intent across societies: How cultural models of mind shape moral reasoning

Abstract

Mental state reasoning has been theorized as a core feature of how we navigate our social worlds, and as especially vital to moral reasoning. Judgments of moral wrong-doing and punish-worthiness often hinge upon evaluations of the perpetrator's mental states. In two studies, we examine how differences in cultural conceptions about how one should think about others' minds influence the relative importance of intent vs. outcome in moral judgments. We recruit participation from three societies, differing in emphasis on mental state reasoning: Indigenous iTaukei Fijians from Yasawa Island (Yasawans) who normatively avoid mental state inference in favor of focus on relationships and consequences of actions; Indo-Fijians who normatively emphasize relationships but do not avoid mental state inference; and North Americans who emphasize individual autonomy and interpreting others' behaviors as the direct result of mental states. In study 1, Yasawan participants placed more emphasis on outcome than Indo-Fijians or North Americans by judging accidents more harshly than failed attempts. Study 2 tested whether underlying differences in the salience of mental states drives study 1 effects by inducing Yasawan and North American participants to think about thoughts vs. actions before making moral judgments. When induced to think about thoughts, Yasawan participants shifted to judge failed attempts more harshly than accidents. Results suggest that culturally-transmitted concepts about how to interpret the social world shape patterns of moral judgments, possibly via mental state inference.

Practical Methodological Reform Needs Good Theory

“…Specifically in this case, theory could help 1) select effects which might be sample-moderated according to prespecified theoretical expectations, rather than vaguely specified intuitions, 2) select the samples which would make strong tests of underlying constructs, xi 3) aid in designing a moderating measure that goes beyond a binary split of an amalgamation of archival data sources that correspond to letters in an acronym, and 4) evaluate the strength of underlying evidence. Alas, this test has not been conducted yet, but theoretically-driven approaches to culture tend to be able to specify when cultural heterogeneity is expected (e.g., Gervais et al, 2017;Henrich et al, 2006;Kitayama & Cohen, 2010;Kline et al, 2018;Legare et al, 2012;McNamara et al, 2019;Purzycki et al, 2016;Smaldino, Lukaszewski, et al, 2019;Willard & Cingl, 2017), while also being able to specify instances where homogeneity might instead be more likely (e.g., Apicella et al, 2012;Sznycer et al, 2017).…”

The Minds of God(s) and Humans: Differences in Mind Perception in Fiji and North America

“…These beliefs also impact moral reasoning. In societies with Opacity of Mind, if an action produced some kind of wrong or harm, then intentionality will not necessarily mitigate people's negative judgments—accidentally taking a bag that was not yours will be judged similarly to an intentional stealing and more harshly than a failing attempt to steal (McNamara et al., ). The specific mechanisms and pathways behind the relationship between these Opacity of Mind beliefs and cognitive development are as yet unknown.…”

“…Reward and punishment give us two morally relevant characteristics that are applicable to both humans and gods, and that should be related to the mental dimensions (Gray & Wegner, ; Gray, Young, & Waytz, ). North Americans see intentional harm as much more punishment worthy than unintentional harm (Cushman, ; McNamara et al., ). The more agency given to people, the more responsible they are for their own actions (Gray & Wegner, ), and the more capable they are of enacting moral punishment on others (Gray & Wegner, ).…”

“…Researchers have gone so far as to say that mind perception abilities are the essence of moral reasoning (Gray et al, 2012). Despite this, how intention is used to determine the consequences of actions is variable across cultures (Barrett et al, 2016;McNamara et al, 2019).…”

“…Our two Fijian samples were samples of Indigenous iTaukei Fijians and Indo‐Fijians. iTaukei Fijians typically follow very different informal rules for understanding and interpreting other people, preferring to avoid intruding into the private mental space of others by talking about the content of others minds and instead focusing on externally visible actions (McNamara, Willard, Norenzayan, & Henrich, ). Indo‐Fijians live in the same broad societal setting as iTaukei Fijians, yet typically hold to a third approach to minds, focusing more on internal mental states than the iTaukei Fijians, while still emphasizing group affiliations and family ties in their perceptions of people.…”