The adoption of poison pills and managerial entrenchment: Evidence from Japan

Arikawa, Yasuhiro; Mitsusada, Yosuke

doi:10.1016/j.japwor.2010.11.003

Cited by 13 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…On the one hand, the hypothesis of the alignment of shareholder interests envisions that the adoption of poison pills may be influenced by factors which seek to reduce agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (Heron & Lie, 2006;Heron & Lie, 2015), such as mechanisms related to corporate governance. On the other hand, it is also possible that its adoption is not influenced by aspects that seek to benefit shareholders (notably minority shareholders), but rather to maintain the current managers in their positions, as demonstrated by the managerial entrenchment hypothesis (Arikawa & Mitsusada, 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Poison pills e governança corporativa: um estudo no mercado acionário brasileiro

Azevedo

Gomes

Nakao

2021

Rev. contab. organ.

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Este estudo tem por objetivo investigar se existe associação entre a adoção de poison pills e os níveis diferenciados de governança corporativa no mercado acionário brasileiro. A amostra é composta por 217 companhias abertas não-financeiras listadas na Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3), com dados disponíveis ao longo do período 2010-2017. A análise de dados realizada por meio de regressões logit e probit evidencia que a adoção de poison pills está positivamente associada à listagem nos segmentos Novo Mercado e Nível 2 de governança corporativa. Assim, a adoção deste dispositivo anti-takeover por companhias que estão listadas nos níveis mais elevados de governança corporativa pode ser útil para atuais e potenciais investidores, ao passo que dado o aumento de companhias abertas com o capital predominantemente disperso no mercado acionário brasileiro, as tentativas de tomada de controle de forma hostil podem ser cada vez mais recorrentes. Além disso, os resultados contribuem teoricamente no sentido de uma possível convergência entre a Teoria da Sinalização e a adoção de poison pills, evidenciando que a adoção desse dispositivo anti-takeover como mecanismo complementar de governança corporativa pode representar um sinal de proteção emitido pelas empresas ao mercado visando a atração de novos investidores.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Poison pills e governança corporativa: um estudo no mercado acionário brasileiro

Azevedo

Gomes

Nakao

2021

Rev. contab. organ.

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“…Arikawa and Mitsusada (2011) showed that adoption of poison pills reveals the manager's preference for entrenchment. In particular, they found that a CEO with longer tenure was more likely to adopt a poison pill when the performance of the firm was poor.…”

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confidence: 99%

The role of corporate governance in Japanese unlisted companies

Fukuda

Kasuya

Nakajima³

2018

Japan and the World Economy

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The purpose of this paper is to examine the effects of corporate governance on the performance of Japanese unlisted companies from 1997 to 2002, when the problem of non-performing loans became serious. Using data of unlisted companies, we examine to what extent the ownership structure has a significant impact on firm's performance. When estimating the determinants of Tobin's q, we find that the ownership structure has a significant influence on the performance of each unlisted company. However, the impact was totally different between companies with good performance and bad performance. In particular, the increase in the shareholding ratio of a specific individual or a parent company worked positively for companies with good performance, but it worked negatively for companies with poor performance. The results suggest that the distorted governance structure in unlisted companies, which had worked well during the bubble economy, may have significantly restricted their recovery under prolonged recession in Japan.

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“…27 See, for example, Bebchuk and Cohen (2005), Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), and Hermalin and Weisbach (2003). Arikawa and Mitsusada (2008) show that Japanese firms experience negative abnormal returns right after announcing introductions of new poison pills. 26 Such stable shareholding prevented hostile takeovers of listed firms in Japan since the early 1950s.…”

Section: Business Practices and Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%