Major formal constitutional change can be an important moment of popular renewal in constitutional democracies (Colon-Rios 2010, 240; Levinson 2008, 173-75). It allows the people themselves to reshape their governmental structure in order to improve governance and modernize institutions. For instance, Iceland's constitutional replacement process from 2009 to 2013 came as a response to large political outcry against an entrenched and corrupt status quo elite. To live up to this promise, however, the institutions in the constitution-making process must enhance popular representation, deliberation, and participation while avoiding a process captured by a factional majority.The prevailing view-taken from democratic theory-is that the best process of largescale, formal constitutional change is an "open" one involving extraordinary institutions. This democratic openness solves two problems stemming from the tyranny of the "status quo." First, openness avoids major constitution-making in ordinary institutions. This will hinder status quo interests from exploiting their dominance of ordinary institutions to push through "abusive" constitutional changes that entrench themselves in power (Landau 2013a). Second, it allows the people to circumvent attempts by an entrenched "status quo" to block constitutional change by allowing them to act through extraordinary institutions (Levinson 2008).