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This article will theorize a previously unidentified type of constitutional design that I call “crown-presidentialism.” Crown-presidential design combines constitutional powers exercised by elected presidents in both presidential and semi-presidential systems. First, as in presidentialism, crown-presidential constitutions grant the elected president final management power over the makeup of the executive-branch government. Second, as in a semi-presidentialism, crown-presidential constitutions afford the elected president guardian powers to control the legislative branch as well as important judicial, prosecutorial, and integrity institutions. This formal design has provided presidents an important tool for dominating both formal and informal politics while claiming fidelity to democratic constitutional design. Crown-presidentialism is therefore an important tool in the super-presidentialism of many new authoritarian regimes. This finding is a reminder of the importance of formal design rules in shaping political behavior—even in some forms of authoritarian governance.

This Article will examine an important - but largely ignored - approach to constitution- making: The use of restored constitutional orders as the basis for the creation of a new constitutional order. Looking at this ‘restoration constitution-making’ in post-communist constitutional transition, it will describe how restoration held both advantages and disadvantages. On one hand, restoration improved the politics of constitution-making by helping to avoid the elite manipulation of extraordinary institutions during constitutional drafting. On the other hand, the restoration of decades-old constitutions also led to restored laws that privileged past generations and undermined broad popular participation. Finally, restoration was an important part of gaining international recognition for independence. This international component suggests that constitution-making is about more than just domestic politics. These findings are an important first step in understanding the potential of restoration to ensure a successful constitutional transition.

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