The Anatomy of Corporate Law

Kraakman, Reinier; Armour, John; Davies, Paul; Enriques, Luca; Hansmann, Henry; Hertig, Gerard; Hopt, Klaus J.; Kanda, Hideki; Pargendler, Mariana; Ringe, Wolf-Georg; Rock, Edward B.

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198739630.001.0001

Cited by 264 publications

(59 citation statements)

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“…The "comply or explain" framework is extremely flexible and although it has not caused corporate governance strategies to converge, precisely because -quite wisely so -such a goal was never included in the EU or national regulatory agendas, it has nevertheless met with considerable popularity amongst regulators and market participants since it provides a commonly acceptable framework for the emergence of various disclosure trends and information that are not hampered in their originality and usefulness by the well-known rigidity of a hard law framework, identified with a stringent "one-size-fits-all" approach that would seem unrealistic in corporate governance (Kraakman et al, 2004). By knowing in advance that the principle allows a corporate entity either to comply with soft law rules or to deviate and explain the reasons for its "non-compliance", a company has a much more convincing incentive -at least in theory -to be substantially more open regarding its corporate governance system.…”

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confidence: 99%

Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the “Comply or Explain” Principle in EU Capital Markets

Sergakis

2015

Accounting, Economics and Law - A Convivium

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The "comply or explain" principle has already acquired significant importance in corporate law and regulations and is considered to be the preferred regulatory tool in the EU for increasing transparency and disclosure of market participants' strategies and activities. The flexibility of the principle is perceived as the most suitable way to create indirect coordination of practices amongst market actors, as well as better mutual understanding of their different priorities. Having initially shown its considerable appeal in the area of corporate governance statements issued by corporate entities, it has now expanded its influence into other areas serving similar transparency imperatives, such as the exercise of stewardship responsibilities by institutional investors and proxy advisors. In this paper, we will focus on the merits and shortfalls of the "comply or explain" principle in all the above-mentioned areas, both at national and at EU levels, and will critically challenge its effectiveness in the current regulatory framework. Moreover, we will seek to justify its continued use by demonstrating its future potential role as a veritable dialogue spectrum between different market participants. Lastly, we will emphasise the need for a soft monitoring process from national regulators which will enable both the "comply or explain" principle and its users to participate in a holistic effort for the adoption of sound investment strategies via the fruitful exchange of views and ideas and better communication with regard to their respective role in capital markets.

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confidence: 99%

Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the “Comply or Explain” Principle in EU Capital Markets

Sergakis

2015

Accounting, Economics and Law - A Convivium

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“…En el caso de las ef, en el que la concentración del poder es habitual (Acero & Alcalde, 2016), la unificación de la propiedad y el control permite mitigar los problemas de agencia mediante el alineamiento de los objetivos de propietarios y directivos (Carney, 2005). No obstante, cuando una familia es el accionista dominante y existen accionistas minoritarios externos a la familia, el problema de agencia tipo II puede llegar a ser más relevante en estas empresas; por lo tanto, esta situación ha sido tratada en la legislación corporativa para proteger a los accionistas minoritarios (Kraakman et al, 2004).…”

Section: Gestión Y Organizaciónunclassified

Relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño en empresas colombianas

Cortés¹,

Ramírez²,

Gómez-Betancourt³

2018

Innovar

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El gobierno corporativo como herramienta para minimizar los problemas de agencia parece tener un efecto positivo en el desempeño. Este trabajo analiza la relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño financiero en empresas colombianas. A través del método generalizado de momentos (GMM), se estimó dicha relación en un panel de datos balanceado para 104 empresas inscritas en el Registro Nacional de Valores y Emisores (RNVE) durante el periodo 2008-2014. Las empresas fueron clasificadas como empresa familiar (EF), cuando se identificó una familia como accionista controlante mayoritario. El desempeño fue aproximado a partir de la rentabilidad del activo (ROA) y la rentabilidad del patrimonio (ROE). Para medir el nivel de gobierno corporativo se usaron las 41 prácticas recomendadas en el Código País. Se encontró que solo las prácticas alusivas a la junta directiva se relacionan con el roa, mientras que en el caso del roe no se encontró evidencia de relación con alguna de las prácticas de gobierno corporativo. Respecto al carácter familiar, se encontró que, cuando una familia es el primer accionista controlante, las empresas presentan mayor desempeño. No obstante, cuando los dos primeros accionistas controlantes son familias, se observó que no existe relación con el desempeño

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“…De acordo com Kraakman et al (2004), Gillan (2006), Becht et al (2002) e Silveira (2010), os mecanismos internos compreendem: um conselho de administração ativo, independente e bem informado; um sistema de remuneração de executivos alinhado aos interesses dos acionistas; e uma estrutura de propriedade concentrada ou dispersa, dependendo do contexto de atuação da firma. Dentre os mecanismos externos têm-se: o ambiente legal; os mercados de aquisição hostil e competitivos, que podem substituir gestores ineficientes; a estrutura de capital com recursos de terceiros, a qual pode reduzir o potencial para destruição de caixa; e, por fim, mas não menos importante, a elaboração e divulgação de relatórios periódicos (e.g.…”

Section: Introductionunclassified

Impacto da adesão às práticas recomendadas de governança corporativa no índice de qualidade da informação contábil

Gabriel¹

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The Anatomy of Corporate Law

Cited by 264 publications

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Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the “Comply or Explain” Principle in EU Capital Markets

Deconstruction and Reconstruction of the “Comply or Explain” Principle in EU Capital Markets

Relación entre gobierno corporativo, control familiar y desempeño en empresas colombianas

Impacto da adesão às práticas recomendadas de governança corporativa no índice de qualidade da informação contábil

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