The Anglo-American “Special Relationship”: The Lazarus of International Relations

‘The impression is growing … that the United States is hard when dealing with us’: Ernest Bevin and Anglo-American relations at the dawn of the cold war

“…Bevin was not entirely comfortable with the approach the FO had evolved since 1944 of 'steering the unwieldy barge' of US foreign policy by getting close to US policy-makers. 55 Bevin preferred a more robust policy of standing up for British viewpoints, defending them rather than either apologising for them or modifying them to meet US domestic political sensitivities. The Labour left wing found him too subservient to the United States and he strongly defended himself against that charge Á while distancing himself from left critics of the United States by avoiding endorsement of their anti-American rhetoric.…”

Beyond Values and Interests: The Anglo-America Special Relationship during the Syrian Conflict

“…What was special is "Special no more" (Dickie, 1994) and the ruptures of Suez and Vietnam, and the go-it-aloneness of the post-Cold War American hyper-state have resigned the AASR to a nostalgic place in the past, not in the present let alone future. In addition, some scholarship has configured the relationship as "Lazarus like" (Marsh & Baylis, 2006) for its continuities in bridging a Transatlantic-European divide. Others have underscored the path dependent nature of the AASR in which intelligence, nuclear and military matters have become institutionalized (Xu, 2016;Schmidt, 2005).…”

“…Britain is simply tied to the US in an inescapable logic of co-dependency that is a normalized and naturalized reality. From the American perspective, there is a definite admission of Britain as being authoritative and listened to which highlights a pivotal power status (Marsh & Baylis, 2006). British involvement from an American perspective might also resonate with "buck-passing" (Mearsheimer, 2001: pp.…”

Reassessing the special relationship

“…35 the anti-communist Argentine junta, data were not at first passed on automatically to Britain, leaving the UK dependent for intelligence on 'clandestine' negotiations with pro-British American officials. 36 Conversely, on European intelligence the United States collates much of its own data from its UK-based SIGINT station at RAF Menwith Hill, autonomously from GCHQ. 37 In contrast, within the arena of human intelligence (humint), Britain's MI5 and MI6 (SIS) agencies retain operational independence, despite close cooperation with their US counterparts.…”

“…To many in Washington, 'the most special relationship of all is undoubtedly that with Israel, as politicians and 90 Timothy Garton Ash, Free world: why a crisis of the West reveals the opportunity of our time (London: Allen Lane, 2004), pp. 36 94 American relations with Australia, its other dependably loyal ally, also have special military and intelligence dimensions. 95 General James Jones, President Obama's National Security Adviser, has remarked that the most important bilateral relationship for the United States is now with China, given the interlinking of economic interdependence with security rivalry.…”