2013
DOI: 10.1016/j.jesp.2013.06.006
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The arousal model of moral condemnation

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Cited by 53 publications
(51 citation statements)
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References 40 publications
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“…The pervasive role of harm across morality is consistent with dyadic morality. Cheng et al, 2013;Kayyal, Pochedly, McCarthy, & Russell, 2015;Royzman, Atanasov, Landy, Parks, & Gepty, 2014;Schein, Ritter, & Gray, 2016). Instead, the appearance of specificity arises from the lack of appropriate control conditions and statistical procedures that obscure overlap (e.g., ANCOVA; Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, 2015) One additional long-standing claim is that "disgust and discomfort drive moral condemnation which are later cloaked with harm based rationalization" (Haidt & Hersh, 2001, p. 212).…”
Section: Testing Strong Modularitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The pervasive role of harm across morality is consistent with dyadic morality. Cheng et al, 2013;Kayyal, Pochedly, McCarthy, & Russell, 2015;Royzman, Atanasov, Landy, Parks, & Gepty, 2014;Schein, Ritter, & Gray, 2016). Instead, the appearance of specificity arises from the lack of appropriate control conditions and statistical procedures that obscure overlap (e.g., ANCOVA; Cameron, Lindquist, & Gray, 2015) One additional long-standing claim is that "disgust and discomfort drive moral condemnation which are later cloaked with harm based rationalization" (Haidt & Hersh, 2001, p. 212).…”
Section: Testing Strong Modularitymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Much research has focused specifically on the role of disgust, with some arguing that disgust causes harsher moral judgments (Eskine et al, 2011; Pizarro, Inbar, & Helion, 2011; Schnall et al, 2008; Wheatley & Haidt, 2005) and others arguing that disgust uniquely affects judgments in the Sanctity domain (Horberg, Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009; Horberg, Oveis, & Keltner, 2011). More recently, some have argued that arousal, rather than specific emotions, are the driving force behind moral judgments (Cheng, Ottati, & Price, 2013). Yet, as noted by Horberg et al (2009), the absence of a standardized set of scenarios that violate particular moral foundations makes it difficult to ascertain the specific effects of emotions across moral domains.…”
Section: Limitations Of Existing Moral Foundations Stimulimentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Mapping moral content onto valence, arousal and moral judgments. Two broad questions that have motivated much research in moral psychology concern (1) the relative importance of different moral content domains for explaining moral judgments [49,121,141,146] and (2) links between moral cognition and the core affective dimensions of valence and arousal [45,[147][148][149][150][151][152]. Here, we describe image-level correlations between moral content ratings on the one hand (i.e., relevance to each of the five moral foundations), and moral judgments, valence and arousal on the other.…”
Section: Inter-rater Consensusmentioning
confidence: 99%