The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road

Callaghan, Michael; Hubbard, Paul

doi:10.1080/17538963.2016.1162970

Cited by 112 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…China has the largest voting share (26.6 percent), holding a veto power in major AIIB decisions requiring a 75 percent supermajority, 7 even though it seems that with the admission of new members Beijing would be ready to accept a dilution of its vote (Kynge and Pilling, 2017). The Articles of Agreements of the AIIB are much in line with statutes of other IFI, even though China has a far larger voting share than the USA in the World Bank or Japan in the ADB (Callaghan and Hubbard, 2016). As for geographic representation, regional members hold at least 75 percent of the total capital stock (unless the provision is changed with a supermajority vote), and 9 of the 12 members of the Board of Directors represent regional members.…”

Section: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Too Much Ado Aboumentioning

confidence: 84%

“…He proposed the "21st century Maritime Silk Road" in Jakarta, Indonesia in October of the same year. The Chinese Government had worked on the idea since 2010 (Chan, 2016), after an ADB working paper advocating a new "Silk Road" for Asia (Bhattacharyay and De, 2009) was published in Chinese (Callaghan and Hubbard, 2016). The BRI is a connectivity and cooperation project involving more than 60 countries across Eurasia, the Middle East, South-East Asia and part of East Africa.…”

Section: The Belt and Road Initiative: Connecting The Eurasian Comentioning

confidence: 99%

“…China's huge foreign exchange reserves (over 30 percent of total global official reserves) could be finally allocated to projects with presumably a higher return than US Treasury bonds (Callaghan and Hubbard, 2016;Chan, 2016).…”

Section: The Belt and Road Initiative: Connecting The Eurasian Comentioning

confidence: 99%

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“Crossing the River by Feeling the Gold”: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Financial Support to the Belt and Road Initiative

Gabusi

2017

China and World Economy

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China's Belt and RoadInitiative (BRI) is, above all, a connectivity project. As connectivity requires financial support, in the past few years China has undertaken several institution-building activities at the national and international level, mainly in the financial and economic sector, showing a new propensity to influence global economic governance. In particular, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) has drawn attention worldwide. How does this institutionbuilding process connect with BRI? Are these institutions just a vehicle for exporting China's capital and overcapacity, or do they signal a potential wider challenge to the post-World War II liberal international order? By analyzing the first loans approved by the bank, the present paper argues that far from representing a China-led challenge to the Western-led liberal order, the AIIB, while promoting Chinese commercial and geopolitical interests, shows the resilience of the global financial regime created by the West.

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Section: Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Too Much Ado Aboumentioning

confidence: 84%

Section: The Belt and Road Initiative: Connecting The Eurasian Comentioning

confidence: 99%

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“Crossing the River by Feeling the Gold”: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Financial Support to the Belt and Road Initiative

Gabusi

2017

China and World Economy

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“…(Xi 2016) Scholars have agreed that the AIIB is a seminal test of expectations of China's international development assistance agenda (e.g. Callaghan and Hubbard 2016). The AIIB's founding also marks a major step in the direction of development financing noted by former World Bank chief economist Justin Lin in 2014, when he wrote of a shift away from official development assistance (ODA) towards other official flows (OOFs), 'OOF-like loans, and OOF-like investments from development banks, and sovereign wealth funds' (SWFs) (Lin and Wang 2014: 18).…”

Section: To the Present: Timely Reform And Opening-up Of Chinese Aidmentioning

confidence: 99%

China’s ‘Innovative and Pragmatic’ Foreign Aid: Shaped by and now Shaping Globalisation

Johnston¹,

Rudyak²

2017

China's New Sources of Economic Growth: Vol. 2

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“…A number of works have discussed the noteworthy China-led multilateral, looking at its institutional features, prospects and challenges Humphrey 2015;Greenwood 2016), potential impacts on the Bretton Woods and in particular global development finance (Kawai 2015;Liao 2015;Reisen 2015;Subacchi 2015) and, most of all, the multiplicity of rationales driving China to initiate the bank (Callaghan and Hubbard 2016;Dollar 2015;Ren 2016;Sohn 2015;Xing 2016). While published literature tends to dwell on the institution per se and to approach China's incentives from a rationalist perspective, this paper turns to the underlying ideational motivations and argues that at the core of the AIIB lies the enduring search of the Middle Kingdom for a greater status in its return to a major global power.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Status-Seeking: China’s Foray into Global Economic Governance

Yang¹

2016

Chin. Polit. Sci. Rev.

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Despite the long-standing debate on the rise of China, there has been relatively little attention to the country's status concerns. This article therefore examines how China sought an enhanced international status by looking into the illustrative case of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). To this end, it employs the social identity theory (SIT) framework applied to international relations (IR), in conjunction with additional insights into institutional innovation. In the IR context, SIT posits that an aspiring state resorts predominantly to one of the three status-seeking strategies-social mobility, social competition and social creativity, i.e., emulating or competing with established powers, or attempting to achieve prestige on a new dimension. As to institutional innovation, it is introduced as a construct to understand the crystallisation of social creativity in the AIIB. By virtue of analysing primary sources and secondary literature, the research at hand finds that in the case of the AIIB China adopted largely, albeit not exclusively, the social creativity strategy to mitigate the doubt of the West and boost the legitimacy of the bank. Specifically, Beijing followed the relevant rules of the game in the institutionbuilding process and presented as a legitimate addition the quintessential statusseeking initiative-partly born out of exasperations with the existing architecture. The case study on such a noteworthy institution-building effort can shed light on the underlying rationales and wider implications of similar China-backed structures and, relatedly, the strategic thinking of the Chinese leadership to seek a greater international status.

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The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank: Multilateralism on the Silk Road

Cited by 112 publications

References 7 publications

“Crossing the River by Feeling the Gold”: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Financial Support to the Belt and Road Initiative

“Crossing the River by Feeling the Gold”: The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the Financial Support to the Belt and Road Initiative

China’s ‘Innovative and Pragmatic’ Foreign Aid: Shaped by and now Shaping Globalisation

The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Status-Seeking: China’s Foray into Global Economic Governance

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