“…There are a considerable number of studies (see for example Chang & Sun (2010), Chtourou, Bedard, & Courteau (2001), Jiang, Lee, & Anandarajan (2008), Klein (2002), Larcker, Richardson, & Tuna (2007), Xie, Davidson, & DaDalt (2003) in the U.S; Baxter& Cotter (2009), Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart, & Kent (2005) in Australia; Peasnell, Pope, & Young (2005) in the UK. ; Bradbury, Mak, & Tan (2006), Rusmin (2010), Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat (2007), Siregar & Utama (2008) in the Asian Countries) which document that the effectiveness of corporate governance mechanisms affect the EM practices of widely held public firms, however there are relatively less studies (Prencipe & Bar-Yosef, 2011;Jaggi, Leung, & Gul, 2009) which investigates whether the measures of corporate governance have the same effect on the level of EM when ownership is not widely dispersed, and in particular when ownership is concentrated in the hands of families.…”