The attack and defense of weakest-link networks

Abstract

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker"s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender"s objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest success functions (CSFs): the auction CSF and the lottery CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction, under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic "guerilla warfare" strategyin which a single random target is attackedmore than 80% of the time. Under the lottery CSF, attackers utilize the stochastic guerilla warfare strategy almost 45% of the time, contrary to the theoretical prediction of an equal allocation of forces across the targets.

The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets

“…7. Kovenock, Roberson, and Sheremeta (2010) experimentally examine behavior in a specification of the game of attack and defense of a single weakest-link network of targets where the conflict at each target is modeled by the Tullock CSF and the specification given in this paper with the auction CSF. Consistent with the theoretical prediction under the auction CSF, attackers utilize a stochastic guerrilla warfare strategy-in which a single random target is attacked-more than 80% of the time.…”

Multi‐battle Contests: An Experimental Study

“…To support this conclusion, we estimated a probit model, where the dependent variable is the probability of winning the overall contest and the independent variables are a constant, a period trend and a dummy variable of whether the subject made positive bids in only two battles or in all three battles. 19 It is important to emphasize that the "guerilla warfare" strategy is also observed in other experiments on Blotto-type games (Chowdhury et al 2013;Deck and Sheremeta 2012;Deck et al in press;Kovenock et al 2016;Montero et al 2016). Kovenock et al (2016), for example, report behavior consistent with stochastic "guerilla warfare" strategy in the simultaneous weakest-link contest.…”

“…19 It is important to emphasize that the "guerilla warfare" strategy is also observed in other experiments on Blotto-type games (Chowdhury et al 2013;Deck and Sheremeta 2012;Deck et al in press;Kovenock et al 2016;Montero et al 2016). Kovenock et al (2016), for example, report behavior consistent with stochastic "guerilla warfare" strategy in the simultaneous weakest-link contest. They find that when the objective for one of the players (attacker) is to win only one battle, then such a player attacks a single battle 80% of the time (even when such behavior is not predicted by the theory).…”

“…Thus, the standard constant-sum Colonel Blotto game is transformed into a nonconstant-sum game due to possible ties. Holt et al (2016) and Kovenock Roberson, and Sheremeta (2016) examine behavior in a weakest-link game in which the attacker needs to win only one battle to win the contest but the defender needs to win all battles. Deck, Sarangi, and Wiser (in press) report the results of a laboratory experiment testing theoretical predictions in a multi-battle contest with value complementarities among the battles, called the game of Hex.…”

Strategic and experimental analyses of conflict and terrorism

“…In the first contribution, Kovenock et al (2018) study the allocations of defensive resources and choices of attack venues over a weakest-link network of targets, for which the aggressor has the objective of attacking successfully any one of the possible targets, while the defender has the objective of guarding all targets. Theoretical analyses of such an environment were provided earlier by Clark and Konrad (2007), under the assumption that the contest success function (CSF) at each target is a lottery CSF, and by Kovenock and Roberson (2017), who assumed that the contest success function at each target is an auction CSF.…”