The Banking and Currency Act of 1913: I

Laughlin, J. Laurence

doi:10.1086/252433

Cited by 5 publications

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“…For example, Boylan (1998) has shown that the current strong independence of the Chilean central bank was introduced during the Pinochet era. The United States Federal Reserve Act was passed in an extraordinary session of Congress in 1913, when the Democrats were in control of both houses and the Presidency (Laughlin, 1914 andLeake, 1917). 11 Berger and de Haan (1999) show how the evolution of the Bundesbank independence was influenced by the institutional structures set up by the Allied powers following World War II and manifested in the Bundesbank Law of 1948.…”

Section: Why Are Independent Central Banks Created?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

2003

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Section: Why Are Independent Central Banks Created?mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

2003

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“…We also look into J.L. Laughlin (1910Laughlin ( , 1914aLaughlin ( , 1914b, P. Warburg (1908Warburg ( , 1911aWarburg ( , 1911bWarburg ( , 1914Warburg ( , 1930, and H.P. Willis (1914Willis ( , 1923, three of the most influential economists and bankers who had written on this subject at that time.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Edwin Walter Kemmerer and the Origins of the Fed

Betancourt¹

2010

J Hist Econ Thought

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In this article we analyze Edwin Walter Kemmerer’s contribution to the creation of the Federal Reserve System. Firstly, we contrast Kemmerer’s role in the transition from the Aldrich banking reform plan to the Glass–Owen plan with those of A. Piatt Andrew (who was Aldrich’s main advisor), H. Parker Willis (i.e., Carter Glass’s advisor), and J.L. Laughlin (who was Willis’ mentor). Secondly, we deal with theoretical questions posed by Kemmerer, who, as we assert, developed his own banking reform plan. Even if his proposals were not immediately taken into account in the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, he contributes to the institutional structure of the Federal Reserve System.

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“…A concern requiring large capital would find difficulty in placing securities or in borrowing money, if its purposes were inimical to combinations or corporations in which these great financial leaders were interested" (Durand 1914b, 397). Other leading figures of the time referred to the Pujo report and pointed out that interlocks had the effect of reducing competition among the leading commercial banks, concentrating control over credit in the hands of a few bankers, and eliminating opportunities for new board members with no conflict of interest (Kemmerer 1913;Laughlin 1914;Sprague 1914).…”

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confidence: 99%

The Influence of American Economists on the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts

Fiorito¹

2012

Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology: A Research Annual

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The aim of this paper is to analyze American economists' influence in the passing of the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts (1914). Specifically, it is argued and documented that American economists were important in this process in two ways. Many economists exercised an "indirect" influence by discussing in academic journals and books problems concerning trusts, combinations, and the necessary measures to preserve the working of competitive markets. At least as importantly, if not more so, some economists took an active role in the reform movement both contributing to draft proposals for the amendment of existing antitrust legislation and providing help and advice during the Congressional debates which led to the passing of the FTC and Clayton Acts. Among these, we will focus primarily, albeit not exclusively, on the contribution of John Bates Clark.

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The Banking and Currency Act of 1913: I

Cited by 5 publications

References 0 publications

The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

The Limits of Delegation: Veto Players, Central Bank Independence, and the Credibility of Monetary Policy

Edwin Walter Kemmerer and the Origins of the Fed

The Influence of American Economists on the Clayton and Federal Trade Commission Acts

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