The Battle for Standardised Cigarette Packaging in Europe

Abstract

This chapter discusses the study findings in light of relevant theory on policy transfer and multi-level governance. Three theoretical conclusions are made: (1) public health policies today are often subject to a policy transfer 'web', in which networks of actors involving both policymakers and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) are required to navigate various different jurisdictions and levels of governance in order to ensure that a policy is successfully adopted; (2) transnational corporations have analytically-significant consequences for policy transfer processes and may act intentionally to disrupt such processes; and (3) the activities of transnational corporate actors can shape subsequent transfer processes, as policy-makers and NGOs build relationships and coalitions in an effort to adapt to, and counteract, global corporate political strategies. Keywords Policy transferThis volume has sought to examine the development of standardised packaging (SP) policy in Europe at both the European Union (EU) and member-state levels, placing developments in Europe within the global context of tobacco-control debates and processes. As the analysis above

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