2007
DOI: 10.1080/02684520701200822
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The British experience with intelligence accountability

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Cited by 25 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…40 And, while it is true that the committee can demand access to any files relating to intelligence, the intelligence services, through the relevant minister of state, can deny such a request if the requested information is regarded as too sensitive. 41 Thus, through its annual reports and investigations into particular events (such as 7/7), the ISC provides a reasonable degree of oversight of the intelligence services. However, the ISC has come under significant criticism for being subservient to the government and perhaps even being regarded as an advocate of the IC.…”
Section: Intelligence Oversightmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…40 And, while it is true that the committee can demand access to any files relating to intelligence, the intelligence services, through the relevant minister of state, can deny such a request if the requested information is regarded as too sensitive. 41 Thus, through its annual reports and investigations into particular events (such as 7/7), the ISC provides a reasonable degree of oversight of the intelligence services. However, the ISC has come under significant criticism for being subservient to the government and perhaps even being regarded as an advocate of the IC.…”
Section: Intelligence Oversightmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Certains ouvrages abordent une problématique large sur les relations entre renseignement, services secrets et démocratie (Gill, 1994 ;Leigh & Lustgarten, 1994 ;Vincent, 1998 ;Robertson, 1999 ;Moran, 2013). D'autres études sont plus spécifi quement focalisées sur la question du contrôle parlementaire et de sa nature particulière dans le cas du renseignement puisque le Parlement est dépossédé de sa fonction d'Oversight au profi t de l'Intelligence & Security Committee (Robertson, 1988 ;Phythian, 2005b ;Gill, 2007aGill, , 2007bPhythian, 2007 ;Omand, 2008).…”
Section: Interrogation Démocratique Et Contrôle Des Services De Renseunclassified
“…Perceived weaknesses in the structure and work of the ISC have been used to reinforce calls for its replacement with a parliamentary select committee (for example, Phythian, 2007). Although proposals for a select committee on intelligence predate the creation of the ISC, recent statements on both sides of the House suggest that the issue has risen up the political agenda.…”
Section: The Intelligence and Security Committeementioning
confidence: 99%
“…The ISC sets its own agenda and, although its proceedings remain secret, it publishes annual reports, and has also produced a number of additional reports on subjects of its own choosing. Although its mandate is limited to the examination of the "administration, policy and expenditure" of the intelligence and security agencies, the Committee has shown an increasing propensity to consider operational matters, and some recent studies have argued that it has exceeded expectations in terms of access to information and established itself as a serious critic of the agencies, for example, with reports on the handling of detainees by British intelligence personnel in Afghanistan, Guantanamo Bay and Iraq (Gill and Phythian, 2006;Glees, Davies and Morrison, 2006;Phythian 2007). …”
Section: The Intelligence and Security Committeementioning
confidence: 99%