The burden of attention: CEO publicity and tax avoidance

Duan, Tinghua; Ding, Rong; Hou, Wenxuan; Zhang, John Ziyang

doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2018.02.010

Cited by 75 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 50 publications

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“…Managing director publicity is defined as information about the president director including the characteristics of the company's leadership in relation to attention to the public and investor expectations (Duan et al, 2018). The main director is the highest leader in the management of a company.…”

Section: President Director's Publicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Majority shareholder is defined as the number of share ownership owned by the president director in a public company (Duan et al, 2018). The majority shareholder who acts as a principal in agency theory wants the implementation of policies or decisions that are in accordance with applicable regulations.…”

Section: Majority Shareholdersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According toMaydew (2001)This of course will be influenced by the amount of income received by the company. Other views by (Armstrong et al, 2015;Desai and Dharmapala, 2006;Duan et al, 2018) states that the incentives received by the majority shareholder have a relationship with corporate tax avoidance. The principle in agency theory explains that the management as the agent of the principal is in charge of carrying out the company's operational activities for the benefit of the company owner.…”

Section: Majority Shareholdersmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The general public views companies to be socially responsible by contributing to the economic welfare of communities where they operate by paying taxes (Christensen and Murphy, 2004). One of the factors that influence tax avoidance activities is found in research conducted by Duan et al (2018). The results of his research state that CEO publicity has a significant negative effect on tax avoidance activities and can have a significant positive effect on tax avoidance if the publicity from the president director is very high.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Research result Maydew (2001) conclude the income of all shareholders in a company as an item in the corporate tax calculation and of course it will be influenced by the amount of income received by the company. Other views by (Armstrong et al, 2015;Desai and Dharmapala, 2006;Duan et al, 2018) states that the incentives received by the majority shareholder have a relationship with corporate tax avoidance, so that this creates a positive relationship between the majority shareholder and tax avoidance. Meanwhile, Lim (2011) states that majority share ownership has a negative effect on tax avoidance activities if the majority share is owned by institutional owners due to binding regulatory reasons.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 4 more Smart Citations

The Effect of Publicity of the President Director and Majority Shareholders on Tax Avoidance

Ivastya

Fanani

2020

Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan Bisnis Airlangga

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The study uses the volume search index (SVI) to see the publicity of the president director through Google Trends, and uses the percentage of share ownership to see stocks that aim to influence tax avoidance. The research object used is a public company registered at PT. Indonesia Stock Exchange and the 50 richest people listed on Forbes in the 2013-2018 period. The sample data of selected companies were 24 companies of 121 observation data for 6 years. This study uses multiple linear analysis. The results of the study support the first hypothesis which indicates that the main director who gets higher attention will do tax avoidance. Firms with higher publicity tend to use more tax planning services from auditors. While the research results contradict the second hypothesis that the higher the share owner will not do tax avoidance.In the end, it is hoped that the results of this research can be used to encourage the government to accelerate the Base Erosion and Profit Shifting mechanism which can be used as a reference for investors and company management to improve tax avoidance strategies so that in the future it will provide maximum benefits for the firm sustainability.

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Section: President Director's Publicitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Majority Shareholdersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Majority Shareholdersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

The Effect of Publicity of the President Director and Majority Shareholders on Tax Avoidance

Ivastya

Fanani

2020

Jurnal Riset Akuntansi Dan Bisnis Airlangga

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Family Firm Heterogeneity and Tax Aggressiveness: A Mixed Gamble Approach

2019

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Few studies try to understand how the unique preferences of family firms affect tax strategies, and how family firm heterogeneity drives variation in tax activities. Drawing on the mixed gamble approach, this study examines the tax aggressiveness of different types of family firms, considering how various sources of heterogeneity alter the perception of potential gains and losses to socioemotional and financial wealth. Based on a panel dataset of 242 private family firms for the period 2012–2014, this study shows that strong family‐owned firms, family firms with a family CFO, family‐founder firms, and family‐named firms display lower levels of tax aggressiveness. These findings demonstrate that family firm heterogeneity is a crucial factor in the mixed gamble calculus of tax aggressiveness.

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Happy troubles? CSR awards and CSR report quality

Guo,

Song,

Wang

2024

Corp Soc Responsibility Env

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We propose that quality of corporate social responsibility (CSR) reports, as measured by independent agencies, will decline when firms perform well in social responsibility. Building on the existing literature on stakeholder theory and existing literature, we theorize that lower‐quality CSR reports may correlate with better actual CSR because performing well in CSR will increase external stakeholders' expectations but simultaneously stimulate discontent among shareholders, forcing firms to mitigate the conflict through CSR reports. This study takes Chinese listed firms from 2010 to 2019 as subjects and examines the relationship between winning prestigious CSR awards and CSR report quality. The results support our hypothesis. We further investigate two moderator variables and find the negative relationship is weakened when firms are state‐owned, potentially resulting in more social expectation pressures from the government and public. As an important financial indicator tracked by internal stakeholders, return on equity weakens this negative relationship.

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The burden of attention: CEO publicity and tax avoidance

Cited by 75 publications

References 50 publications

The Effect of Publicity of the President Director and Majority Shareholders on Tax Avoidance

The Effect of Publicity of the President Director and Majority Shareholders on Tax Avoidance

Family Firm Heterogeneity and Tax Aggressiveness: A Mixed Gamble Approach

Happy troubles? CSR awards and CSR report quality

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