The Canberra Plan neglects ground

Abstract

This paper argues that the "Canberra Plan" picture of physicalistic reduction of mind--a picture shared by both its proponents and opponents, philosophers as diverse as

Grounding, conceivability, and the mind-body problem

“…Second, the hyperintensional grounding regimentation evinces how functionalist approaches to the ontology of consciousness can be explanatory, because the identification of phenomenal properties with functional organization can be defined via the foregoing ground-theoretic explanatory properties. Block (2015) suggests thatby contrast to Phenomenal Realist Type Identity-identifying phenomenal properties with functional roles cannot sufficiently account for the ground-theoretic explanation of the identity. Block distinguishes between metaphysical and ontological versions of physicalism.…”

Experiencing left and right in a non‐orientable world

“…Crucially, the functionalist offers us some solace: all of the different realizations play a common functional role. Still, some argue that this is not solace enough, and that the functionalist cannot account for the intuition that phenomenal similarities are genuine objective similarities (see e.g., Block, 2015 and Pautz, 2017).…”

What's Wrong With Brute Supervenience? A Defense of Horgan on Physicalism and Superdupervenience

“… The relationship between functionalism and reductionism is disputed; for a defense of a non‐reductive understanding of functionalism, see Block . Although Kim takes functionalism to entail a metaphysical reductionism, Melnyk understands its reductionist implications in explanatory terms. …”