The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified—Causally

Strevens, Michael

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0068.2004.00466.x

Cited by 138 publications

(91 citation statements)

References 19 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“…Given these facts, we suspect that the higher than expected ratings for the statistical items in the natural kind condition is due to participants perceiving a nonarbitrary causal chain between the kind and the t-properties, and thus were more willing to say that the kind of thing the thing is plays a role in explaining why it has the t-property it does. 7 That is, items with statistical connections to a kind in the case of natural kinds may be more likely to be identified as a kairetic (difference making) causal factor (Strevens, 2004). As discussed by Prasada and Dillingham (2006), the formal mode of explanation complements rather than replaces other modes of explanation.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representation of Principled Connections: A Window Onto the Formal Aspect of Common Sense Conception

2009

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Nominal concepts represent things as tokens of types. Recent research suggests that we represent principled connections between the type of thing something is (e.g., DOG) and some of its properties (k-properties; e.g., having four legs for dogs) but not other properties (t-properties; e.g., being brown for dogs). Principled connections differ from logical, statistical, and causal connections. Principled connections license (i) the expectation that tokens of the type will generally possess their k-properties, (ii) formal explanations (i.e., explanation of the presence of k-properties in tokens of a type by reference to the type of thing it is), and (iii) normative expectations concerning the presence of k-properties in tokens of the type. The present paper investigates the hypothesis that representing principled connections requires representing properties as aspects of being the relevant kind of thing (Aspect Hypothesis). Experiment 1 provides a direct test of the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiments 2 and 3 provide indirect tests of the Aspect Hypothesis. All three experiments provide support for the Aspect Hypothesis. Experiment 4 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the manner in which formal explanations are licensed by principled connections. Finally, Experiment 5 investigates a prediction of the Aspect Hypothesis concerning the nature of the normative expectations licensed by principled connections. Together these results provide strong evidence for the idea that representing principled connections involves representing a property as being an aspect of being a given kind of thing. The results also help clarify the manner in which formal explanation differs from other modes of explanation. Finally, the results of the experiments are used to motivate a proposal concerning the formal structure of the conceptual representations implicated by principled connections. This structure provides a domain-general way of structuring our concepts and embodies the perspective we take when we think and talk of things as being instances of a kind.

show abstract

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Representation of Principled Connections: A Window Onto the Formal Aspect of Common Sense Conception

2009

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Most of these details do not make a difference to the occurrence of the breaking and what does explain the glass being broken is that an object was thrown with such and such a momentum at a fragile window. (Strevens, 2004) A good explanation will discriminate the difference makers from the rest of the causal factors which played a role in generating the explanandum. Brute-force models include all of the factors, but our explanatory practices may demand more discrimination.…”

Section: Brute-force Models Would Have No Meaning For Usmentioning

confidence: 99%

Forty Years of ‘The Strategy’: Levins on Model Building and Idealization

Weisberg

2007

Biol Philos

106

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract.This paper is an interpretation and defense of Richard Levins' "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology." Levins "The Strategy" has been extremely influential among biologists since its publication forty years ago. In this influential article, Levins confronts some of the deepest philosophical issues surrounding modeling and theory construction. By way of interpretation, I will discuss each of Levins' major philosophical themes: the problem of complexity, the existence and consequence of tradeoffs, and robustness analysis. I will argue that Levins' article is concerned, at its core, with justifying the use of multiple, idealized models in population biology.Keywords: Richard Levins, tradeoffs, models, model building, idealization, robustness, population biology, theoretical ecology, complex systems Richard Levins' article "The Strategy of Model Building in Population Biology" is one of the most influential philosophical discussions about theory construction. It is frequently cited by population biologists and while less known among philosophers of science, it was was in included in the first edition of Elliott Sober's widely used philosophy of biology anthology. (Sober, 1984) Levins article contains enormous insight into some of the deepest philosophical issues surrounding modeling and theory construction. His focus on the practice of modeling, rather than on the outcome of mature theorizing, revealed important aspects of the enterprise that had not previously been appreciated. For example, he called attention to the tradeoffs one faces when constructing and analyzing models. He also thoughtfully discussed different strategies for constructing models, the complex ways that one gathers confirming evidence for these models, and the pitfalls associated with aiming for complete representations at the expense of all other considerations.Despite the importance of Levins' article, it has received very little critical attention by philosophers of science. Notable exceptions include articles by William Wimsatt (1987Wimsatt ( , 1981 and a joint article by Stephen Orzack and Elliott Sober (1993). Within the last few years, several discussions of Levins' article and related methodological discussions have started to appear (Odenbaugh, ms; Weisberg, 2004; Weisberg, forthcoming-a) and a conference has been devoted to "The Strategy of Model Building" and Levins' methodological work, from which many of the papers in this issue of Biology and Philosophy are drawn.

show abstract

“…The claim that the causal-structural account of scientific theories allows us to get a grip on explanatory unification within a causalist framework may suggest that this account is similar in spirit to Strevens' ([2004]), at least prima facie. After all, Strevens also endeavours to 'unify the causal and unificatory approaches to explanation-causally' (see the title of his paper).…”

Section: Explanatory Unificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Yet there are some important differences which reward further examination. (Strevens [2004] focuses on explanations of events or singular facts, whereas I have been focusing here on explanations of regularities, yet the differences I mention carry over to the kairetic account of the explanation of laws and regularities; see Strevens [2008] on the tenability of the Causal Markov Condition).…”

Section: Explanatory Unificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…After all, Strevens also endeavours to 'unify the causal and unificatory approaches to explanation-causally' (see the title of his paper). More specifically, his goal is 'a causal account of explanation that has many of the advantages of the unification account' (Strevens [2004], p. 154). Yet there are some important differences which reward further examination.…”

Section: Explanatory Unificationmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal–Structural Account

Leuridan¹

2014

The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What are scientific theories and how should they be represented?In this paper I propose a causal-structural account, according to which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitcher's unificationist view, and Darden's theory of theoretical components), this leaves room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an interesting account of explanation is provided which sheds light on explanatory unification within a causalist framework. The theory of classical genetics is used as a case study.

show abstract

The Causal and Unification Approaches to Explanation Unified—Causally

Cited by 138 publications

References 19 publications

Representation of Principled Connections: A Window Onto the Formal Aspect of Common Sense Conception

Representation of Principled Connections: A Window Onto the Formal Aspect of Common Sense Conception

Forty Years of ‘The Strategy’: Levins on Model Building and Idealization

The Structure of Scientific Theories, Explanation, and Unification. A Causal–Structural Account

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About