2020
DOI: 10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104001
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The Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement as an element in the evolving Arctic Ocean governance complex

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Cited by 27 publications
(14 citation statements)
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“…7 Officially the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, the CAOFA is a binding 16-year fishing moratorium in international Arctic waters that was signed in 2018 by six Arctic states, the European Union, China, Japan, and South Korea. On the CAOFA's role as part of the broader set of Arctic governance mechanisms, see Vylegzhanin, Young, and Berkman, 2020. 8 Some dialogue has continued to take place, absent Russia. 9 Charron argues that Permanent Participant status provides indigenous groups in the Arctic with "a role more significant than usually afforded them at the UN and other multilateral meetings" (Charron, 2012, p. 767)…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…7 Officially the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High Seas Fisheries in the Central Arctic Ocean, the CAOFA is a binding 16-year fishing moratorium in international Arctic waters that was signed in 2018 by six Arctic states, the European Union, China, Japan, and South Korea. On the CAOFA's role as part of the broader set of Arctic governance mechanisms, see Vylegzhanin, Young, and Berkman, 2020. 8 Some dialogue has continued to take place, absent Russia. 9 Charron argues that Permanent Participant status provides indigenous groups in the Arctic with "a role more significant than usually afforded them at the UN and other multilateral meetings" (Charron, 2012, p. 767)…”
Section: Methodsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The difficulty of distinguishing between the interests of Chinese companies and those of the central government will make it all the harder to tell which is the overriding factor (Klinger and Muldavin 2019 ), at least for those outside of China. The European Union and three Asian states joined six Arctic states to complete the CAO Fisheries Agreement, a recognition of major non-Arctic interests in Arctic marine resources (Vylegzhanin et al 2020 ). Should fish species shift farther north and increase in abundance, pressure will likewise increase to turn a fishing moratorium into a fisheries management regime.…”
Section: Implications For Global Affairsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…the Bering Strait) under the jurisdiction of the Arctic states and would in practice necessitate reliance on coastal infrastructure and communications facilities. Russia acknowledges the legitimacy of these interests on the part of non-Arctic states as exemplified in its active participation in the development of the Central Arctic Ocean Fisheries Agreement (Vylegzhanin et al, 2020). At the same time, there is a range of perspectives both in Russia and elsewhere regarding the merits of including non-Arctic states like China in cooperative arrangements dealing with Arctic issues (Lackenbauer & Manicom, 2013;Conley et al, 2017).…”
Section: The Ac In Russian Law and Policymentioning
confidence: 99%