Amid geopolitical tension, science aligns common interests

This article examines the existing governance arrangements applicable to the Bering Strait Region (BSR), assesses the emerging needs for governance in the region, and considers options for addressing these needs. Widely regarded as a critical chokepoint between the North Pacific and the Arctic Ocean (and its marginal seas), the BSR is subject to a variety of regimes, ranging from global constitutive arrangements (e.g., 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea) to bilateral operational arrangements. The growth of human activities in the BSR, associated with transformative changes occurring in the Arctic in recent years, is generating new needs for governance. This article reveals options that can be used or ignored by decision makers, in contrast to recommendations that may involve advocacy, with the single objective of contributing to informed decision making in this realm.

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The Arctic is saturated with nuclear facilities bringing both benefits for regional economic and social development and risks of nuclear and radiological accidents and concerns about radioactive wastes. There is every reason to expect the Arctic will remain a nuclearized region during the foreseeable future. This makes it important to direct attention to issues of nuclear safety and security in the region. We identify several clusters of these issues in the Arctic, including the challenges of potential nuclear accidents, the handling of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste, the cleanup of radiological contaminants, and concerns about nuclear security. An analysis of international conventions and voluntary codes of conduct shows that they are applicable to Arctic nuclear safety and security, but only in general terms. This suggests a need for an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear and radiological safety, emergency preparedness and response, and cleanup of radiological contaminants. The outbreak of military hostilities in Ukraine in February 2022 has disrupted normal procedures for addressing issues of common concern in the Arctic. But the need for cooperation regarding matters like nuclear safety and security will not go away. Assuming it is possible to devise “necessary modalities” for restarting the work of the Arctic Council following the acute phase of the Ukraine crisis, an Arctic-specific agreement on nuclear safety and security could be developed under the auspices of the Arctic Council, which already has taken an interest in nuclear safety through the activities of its Working Group on Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response. Once such an agreement is in place, it will become important to consider the infrastructure needed to ensure that its provisions are implemented effectively.

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