The Civil Rights Movement and the Logic of Social Change

Abstract

Social movements have wrought dramatic changes upon American society. This raises the question: Why do some movements succeed in their endeavors while others fail? Luders answers this question by introducing an analytical framework that begins with a shift in emphasis away from the characteristics of movements toward the targets of protests and affected bystanders and why they respond as they do. This shift brings into focus how targets and other interests assess both their exposure to movement disruptions as well as the costs of conceding to movement demands. From this point, diverse outcomes stem not only from a movement's capabilities for protest but also from differences among targets and others in their vulnerability to disruption and the substance of movement goals. Applied to the civil rights movement, this approach recasts conventional accounts of the movement's outcome in local struggles and national politics and clarifies the broader logic of social change.

Deliberative protests? Persuading politicians not to close schools in Swedish municipalities

“…Hence, the effect of this variable could also refer to the importance of intensity of protests. The results are similar to findings of several prior studies, which show that disruptive tactics help movements attain their goals (Piven and Cloward 1979, Gamson 1990, Luders 2010). …”

“…It has been shown that activists whose protests generate higher disruption costs have a higher likelihood to achieve their goals (Luders 2010). In contrast to being persuaded by the better argument, decisionmakers rationally compare the costs of disruption, that is the damage caused by protests or the loss of votes in future elections, with the costs of concession.…”

Explaining Dynamic Strategies for Defending Company Legitimacy: The Changing Outcomes of Anti-Sweatshop Campaigns in France and Switzerland

“…Studies have highlighted movement internal factors such as tactics (Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010;B. G. King, 2008a;Raeburn, 2004) or framing (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003;Raeburn, 2004), characteristics of corporations (Briscoe & Safford, 2008;de Bakker & den Hond, 2008;den Hond & de Bakker, 2007;Eesley & Lenox, 2006;Holzer, 2008;Luders, 2006Luders, , 2011Weber et al, 2009;Zald et al, 2005) and industries (B. G. King, 2008b;B. G. King & Soule, 2007;Raeburn, 2004;Schurman, 2004;Schurman & Munro, 2009;Soule, 2009;Vasi, 2009;Wahlström & Peterson, 2006), and the interplay between the two (B. G. King, 2008b).…”

Quality over quantity? Technical information, interest advocacy and school closures in Sweden

“…319-322), elected officials are more likely to be responsive to movements if their collective actions are larger than what the elected official anticipated and if the elected official perceives that responsiveness would be beneficial to securing re-election. Protests are often assumed to serve as a signal to elected officials regarding changes in public opinion (for example, Agnone, 2007;Luders, 2010;Morales et al, 2014). This mechanism will be referred to as the protest mechanism.…”